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FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR VACCINATION 
INDUCED INJURIES 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 1976, Private Lewis reported to sick call at Fort Dix, 
New Jersey. He had an upper respiratory infection and was told to 
remain in bed for 48 hours. Instead, he went on a march, collapsed, 
was taken to the infirmary where he died on February 4, 1976. 
Shortly after Private Lewis became ill, many other soldiers began 
to report to sick call with upper respiratory disorders. The New 
Jersey Department of Public Health laboratory evaluated throat 
cultures from the sick soldiers and found AlVictoria flu virus and 
another unidentifiable virus. The specimens were then sent to the 
federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC)! in Atlanta where some 
were found to contain swine flu virus. Thus began the largest public 
health vaccination program in history, to be followed by one of the 
largest collections of tort law suits. 2 
Almost a decade after Private Lewis died, the litigation continues. 3 
The number of suits, and the cost of this litigation have had sub-
stantial influence on the development of public policy concerning 
vaccination programs. To understand the policy and legal issues 
arising from inoculation programs requires some understanding of 
how and why such programs develop. 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program, The George Wash-
ington University. J. D., Rutgers University, 1962; M.P.H., The Johns Hopkins University, 
1985. My research assistant has been Edna G. Reitze, R.N., B.S.N. 
1 The Centers for Disease Control is an agency of the Public Health Service within the 
Department of Health and Human Services. It is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. 
2 Wecht, The Swine Flu Immunization Program: Scientific Venture or Political Folly? 3 
AM. J.L. & MED. 425, 427 (1977) citing Boffey, Anatomy of a Decision: How the Nation 
Declared War on Swine Flu, 192 SCIENCE 636 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wechtj. 
8 One hundred sixty seven cases were pending in April, 1985. TORTS BRANCH, CIVIL DIV., 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SWINE FLU STATISTICS, 1985 [hereinafter cited as DEPT. OF JUSTICEj. 
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This article explores the legal and public policy issues surrounding 
recent government vaccination programs. The second and third sec-
tions discuss the swine flu epidemic and concludes that the federal 
acceptance of tort liability creates a system of compensation that is 
simply too expensive for general use where claims might be very 
numerous. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the DPT controversy 
and the proposed federal legislation and concludes that the approach 
has merit but, a dual tort/compensation system is also too expensive. 
The article concludes with a recommendation for a program, broad 
in scope, to cover injuries from vaccination, but with reduced ben-
efits to cover medical costs and lost earnings. 
II. THE SWINE FLU EPIDEMIC 
Influenza is a family of viruses4 that continually change molecular 
makeup.5 They produce an acute contagious respiratory infection 
characterized by sudden onset, chills, headache, myalgia (muscle 
tenderness) and sometimes prostration. The severity of the illness 
is dependent upon the molecular structure of the organism. 6 The 
disease affects birds and animals as well as humans (the first flu 
virus, for example, was isolated from a pig in 1930). It can also 
reside in one specie without much effect and then seriously affect a 
different specie. A small change in molecular structure can create a 
deadly hybrid that will sweep through a population. The capacity of 
a virus to change molecular structure can make vaccines obsolete. 
These molecular changes can also change a nuisance disease (one 
with little effect on humans) into a killer. In the 1918-1919 influenza 
pandemic, twenty million people died world-wide, and two billion 
people suffered from the disease. In the United States approximately 
500,000 people died. What makes a virus deadly? No one seems to 
know. 7 
In January 1976, when a number of United States Army recruits 
came down with respiratory ailments at Fort Dix, laboratory cul-
4 A virus is a minute organism that has a parasitic dependency on host cells for metabolic 
and reproductive needs. They consist of a strand of either deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or 
ribonucleic acid (RNA) but not both. They are surrounded by a capsid, a covering of protein. 
Hall, The Flu, 4 SCIENCE 83 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hall]. 
5 Influenza is caused by a myxovirus. These are medium-sized, spherical, ether-sensitive, 
enveloped, single-stranded RNA viruses. They have a helical symmetry and replicate in the 
nucleus of the parasitized cell. SMITH, MICROBIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY, 286 (11th ed. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as SMITH]. 
6 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1856 (Thomas 15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 
cited as MEDICAL DICTIONARY]. 
7 Hall, supra note 4. 
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tures completed by the state turned up Victoria virus, which had 
been the dominant type of human influenza since 1968. However, 
the CDC discovered four cases, including the one fatality, that were 
identified as swine flu. These swine flu cases created great concern 
among public health professionals. They realized that the recruits 
could have been infected through human-to-human transmission 
without contact with pigs, and that this type of virus could affect 
the American populace which lacked the specific antibodies necessary 
to protect itself. The Fort Dix virus differed from the established 
influenza circulating in the human population because its surface 
proteins ("antigens") had changed. The experts believed that 
antigenic8 shifts were likely to be followed by pandemics similar to 
the swine flu pandemic in 1918.9 
A. The Federal Governmental Response 
The national public health apparatus became active: CDC's parent 
entity, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
(now HHS), responded through the Public Health Service (PHS); 
the Food and Drug Administration responded through the Bureau 
of Biologics (BoB), whose responsibility it is to license and test 
vaccines lO; and the National Institutes of Health responded through 
its National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). 
8 Flu viruses fall into three types: A, B, and C. Type A, the most variable, causes pandemics 
as well as the more common seasonal outbreaks; type B causes smaller outbreaks; and type 
C rarely causes serious health problems. A fiu virus has two surface proteins, hemagglutinin 
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA). The HA breaks into the host cell where the virus can replicate. 
The N A permits all the viral offspring to break free of the host cell once replication is complete. 
The HA and NA structures allow viruses to be classified. A-type viruses can be classified into 
13 HA subtypes and 9 NA subtypes. The two surface proteins seem to be the reason that fiu 
can change from year to year. An antigenic drift develops when a genetic change occurs in 
the gene code for the 550 or so amino acids in the HA or NA molecule. When sufficient 
changes develop, the drift becomes a shift. This usually results in a major pandemic. In the 
twentieth century, we have had the 1918 fiu pandemic, the Asian fiu of 1957, and the Hong 
Kong fiu of 1968. But accurate prediction of when shifts will occur is very difficult and creates 
problems for public health policy makers. 
9Id. 
10 When Joseph Califano became Secretary of HEW at the end of the swine fiu program in 
1977 he decided that a scholarly study of the entire program would be useful to policy makers. 
He asked Richard E. Neustadt and Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D. of Harvard University to make 
a study. This study was published as a book. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU 
AFFAIR, DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE GPO #017-000-00210-4 (1978) [herein-
after cited as NEUSTADT & FINEBERG). This book is the seminal study on this subject, and, 
unless otherwise footnoted, is the source of this article's material on the evolution of the 
swine-fiu program. Nothing inconsistent with the Neustadt and Fineberg book was found in 
the many sourses cited in this article that would effect my legal analysis. 
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On February 20, 1976, the media covered a CDC press conference 
on the swine flu cases. The Army, continuing its own investigation 
at Fort Dix, found many new influenza cases, but none were swine 
flu. Analysis of every civilian case of flu near the Fort showed no 
swine flu. By the end of February, the Army had found one death, 
perhaps thirteen sick men, and up to 500 recruits who had caught 
and resisted the disease. 11 This latter group showed a rise in swine 
flu antibodies, but had no apparent illness. 12 
On March 10, 1976, the federal group of agencies met to consider 
its options. 13 The flu season ends in the Northern Hemisphere in 
March, but decisions had to be made before the next flu season. The 
four active vaccine manufacturers14 had produced about 20 million 
doses of Victoria vaccine for the civilian market that year. The 
vaccine is grown in eggs, and time is required to produce large 
amounts. A new vaccine would also require immunization trials and 
extensive testing. For a large immunization program, manufacturers 
would have to substantially increase production. 
A major participant in swine flu policy making was David J. Sen-
cer, M.D., Director of CDC. He was faced with a no-win situation. 
If a pandemic did not occur and the government prepared for one, 
it would be criticized for wasting money. If the government did 
prepare and there was a pandemic, it would be blamed if the program 
did not work well. Furthermore, the government had never before 
attempted to provide effective protection to millions of people in a 
short time. The all-out effort to respond before the next flu season 
would interrupt other work and divert resources from the many 
other CDC health research projects. The public health professionals 
were aware of the severity of the 1918 flu pandemic and knew that 
immunity was not present in the existing population. Since the in-
fection brings on the disease within a few days, and inoculation 
brings about immunity in two weeks, an individual must receive the 
vaccine before the disease becomes established. Therefore, stock 
piling the vaccine would not be a viable option. The federal agencies' 
recommendation was sweeping: a federal government purchase of 
the vaccine for the entire population. It would be produced by the 
private sector, field tested through NIAID, and licensed by BoB. 
States would be involved in planning an inoculation program to use 
11 NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 8. 
12 See Wecht, supra note 2, at 428. 
13 See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 9. 
14 Domestic producers of influenza virus vaccine are: Lederle Laboratories; Merck Sharp & 
Dohme; Parke-Davis; and Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN-
STITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 162 (1985). 
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a mix of public and private services. The CDC would supervise the 
operations. The estimated cost was $134 million, $100 million for 
vaccine, and the rest for administration, surveillance and research. 
Dr. Sencer submitted the recommendation to the Secretary of HEW 
on March 15, 1976. The HEW hierarchy, aware that people travelling 
by jet aircraft could move the disease throughout the country in a 
few weeks, supported CDC, even though the risk was unknown. It 
was a risk where inaction was politically unacceptable. 
On March 22, President Ford held a meeting on this subject. He, 
too, was aware it was a no-win issue. If there was a pandemic, no 
matter what the government did, it would not be enough. If the 
pandemic did not materialize, the government would be criticized 
for its expensive response. But the more important problems that 
actually developed were not called to President Ford's attention. He 
was not warned about side effects of the vaccine, children's dosage 
problems, the difficulties in obtaining liability insurance, and the 
problems of public relations. 
President Ford decided to consult experts outside the government 
before deciding to proceed. On March 24, the experts, including both 
Doctors Salk and Sabin of polio vaccine fame, assembled. Doctor 
Salk strongly urged mass immunization. Doctor Sabin, who had 
previously indicated his support, ratified his position. President Ford 
asked the assembled experts for a show of hands on whether to 
proceed. All hands went up. He asked whether there were any 
dissents or objections. There were none. President Ford immedi-
ately held a press conference and, with Doctors Salk and Sabin 
flanking him, announced he was asking Congress for $135 million to 
inoculate every person in the United States. The media suspected 
the decision was a political one and covered it cynically; the cynicism 
was apparently fed by dissent from within CDC. 
Congress responded with alacrity to the President's request for 
money. On April 9, 1976 the Senate acted. On April 12, the House 
followed and the appropriation bill became law on April 15. 15 The 
Federal government was committed to inoculating 95 percent of the 
population - about 200 million people. 
CDC staff specialists, however, considered the task to be impos-
sible. Once allergic persons, infants, and the very ill were excluded, 
then perhaps 150 million inoculations would be a realistic target. 
15 The appropriation was tacked on to a pending supplemental bill. There was therefore no 
authorization bill but rather an appropriation under Title III of the Public Health Service 
Act. The substantive health subcommittees wanted authorizing legislation which did come in 
August of 1976. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 31 and 128. 
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However, a power struggle developed almost immediately to see 
who in HEW would run the program and CDC quickly lost. While 
CDC remained a participant and was involved in the important 
surveillance work, CDC in Atlanta failed to muster the Washington 
presence necessary to run the program. Theodore Cooper, M.D., 
Assistant Secretary for Health of HEW emerged as the director of 
the combined federal task force. 16 Cooper, unfortunately, had no 
authority over the Office of General Council (OGC). This flaw became 
important as legal issues began to dominate the program during the 
summer of 1976. 17 
On March 25, the key organizations within HEW met to determine 
program targets. The aim was to begin vaccination by August (in 
1918, the virulent phase of the pandemic began in August). The 
government wanted 200 million doses to be manufactured, to be 
delivered beginning in June. There would be no further production 
of Victoria vaccine. Existing Victoria vaccine would be made 
bivalent18 by adding swine flu vaccine. This would provide 30 million 
doses for high risk groups - mainly the elderly. The rest of the 
vaccine would be a single dose, monovalent19 vaccine. 
Dissent surfaced early in the program. On April 2, 1976, CDC 
hosted a meeting to acquaint state health officials and private sector 
medical representatives with the program targets and planning 
needs. During this meeting there was disagreement as to the need 
for such a program. A few state officials spoke out against the 
program, but there was tremendous professional pressure to close 
ranks and to support the government's decision. The New York 
Times, however, editorialized against the swine flu program on Feb-
ruary 23, and again on April 6. 20 Furthermore, while other countries 
of the world took steps to inoculate high risk groups, none attempted 
to imitate the United States response. 
The planning for field trials involved NIAID, BoB, and CDC. 
Vaccine from each manufacturer had to be tested as well as "whole" 
and "split" vaccine,21 because two different methods of preparing the 
16 Despite Coopers' power, the program was later criticized for having no clear line of 
command and no single lead. [d. at 36. 
17 See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 34. 
18 The bivalent vaccine would provide protection from both swine flu and Victoria flu. [d. 
at 37. 
19 Monovalent vaccine would provide protection only from swine flu. 
20 See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 40. 
21 A "split" vaccine involves the process of taking the whole virus cell vaccine and separating 
out the toxic components from the protective ones. 
1986] VACCINATION INDUCED INJURIES 175 
killed-virus vaccine were used. One criticism of the trials was that 
children, who ordinarily need either stronger, or more, doses, for 
inoculations to be effective, were not tested with two doses. 
While field trials progressed, CDC worked with state and local 
governments to develop implementation plans. Some jurisdictions 
dragged their feet because they did not support the inoculation 
program. By June, 1976, problems began to develop. Dr. Sabin 
publicly disagreed with the government's program and advocated 
active stockpiling rather than immediate immunization. The field 
trials indicated single doses worked poorly on children. The whole 
cell vaccine did work but caused reactions ranging from sore arms 
to high fever. The "split" vaccine did not cause reaction problems, 
but it did not work. If more than one dose was needed, the produc-
tion facilities, already strained, would probably not have the capacity 
to produce enough vaccine. Finally, CDC announced that the pro-
gram would not initially vaccinate children. To most health profes-
sionals this decision did not make sense because children are usually 
the major targets for immunization; in previous pandemics, children 
were the primary disease spreaders. While critics cautioned and 
suggested a slower pace, CDC's leadership advocated a full speed 
ahead approach. CDC's approach was the one adopted. 
B. The Legal System's Response 
1. Insurance Coverage 
The first major crisis in the inoculation program occurred in June, 
1976. The insurance industries refused to continue coverage for the 
manufacturers of vaccine; existing coverage expired on June 30. An 
indemnification bill went to Congress on June 16,22 but Congress 
was' not in any hurry to agree to pay the prospective legal costs of 
the swine flu program. Thus, the manufacturers refused to bottle 
the vaccine, and the program slammed to a halt. 
The primary reason for industry's fear concerning the supplying 
of swine flu vaccine was the Fifth Circuit's 1974 decision in the case 
of Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories.23 In this case, the court upheld a 
jury award of $200,000 to an eighteen month old child who had 
contracted polio after receiving the Sabin live-virus oral vaccine. The 
vaccine carried a warning of its danger, but the warning was not 
22 NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 131 (App.C). 
23 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). 
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conveyed to those receiving the vaccine. The court found the man-
ufacturer strictly liable for the child's injuries. The court used a two 
step analysis for defining an "unavoidably unsafe product". 24 A prod-
uct is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous. However, a product 
is not unreasonably dangerous per se when the benefits from its use 
outweigh the potential harm. While the polio vaccine was not unrea-
sonably dangerous per se, it was unreasonably dangerous as mar-
keted because it was not marketed with an adequate warning.25 The 
court held that, when the manufacturer has reason to know that the 
drug will not be administered with an individualized medical judg-
ment regarding the risk of treatment, a warning that reaches only 
the physician is insufficient. 26 The manufacturer must give recipients 
sufficient information to enable them to balance risks and benefits. 27 
When Mrs. Reyes, the mother of the infant plaintiff, took her 
daughter to the Hidalgo County Department of Health Clinic in 
Mission, Texas, she signed a standard release liability form used in 
Texas. The form conveyed no warning.28 She had a seventh grade 
education, and her primary language was Spanish. The vaccine had 
been purchased by the Texas Department of Public Health. Included 
with each vial of ten doses was a circular provided by the defendant 
Wyeth Laboratories that warned of potential dangers.29 The public 
health nurse who administered the shot had read the directions on 
the package insert but had not conveyed the warnings to the mother. 
In products liability cases, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the 
product caused the injury; and, (2) that a warning would have caused 
the plaintiff to act differently.3o In Reyes,31 the court paid little 
attention to the causation issue, despite expert testimony that esti-
mated the child's risk of contracting polio was one in 3,000, and the 
risk of contracting this type of polio from the vaccine was one in 5.88 
million. 32 The court did not require the plaintiff to show that a 
warning would have caused her to act differently. Instead, it held 
that there was a rebuttable presumption that the consumer would 
have read any warning and acted to minimize the risk. 33 
24 Id. at 1273. 
25 I d. at 1276. 
26 Id. at 1277. 
2:l Id. at 1294. 
28 Id. at 1270. 
29 Id. 
30 Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio 
and Flu Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754, 758 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Franklin & MaisJ. 
31 498 F.2d at 1264. 
32 See Franklin & Mais, supra note 30, at 758. 
33 498 F.2d at 1281. 
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The Reyes court's reasoning is not persuasive. Polio existed in the 
community; indeed that is probably how Anita Reyes contracted 
polio. The mother's choice was either to not vaccinate her child, 
which would be both dangerous for the child and illegal under Texas 
law, or to pay a private physician to administer the killed Salk 
vaccine34 to the child. The Salk vaccine, however, has disadvantages; 
it must be injected by hypodermic needle, and a separate inoculation 
is required for each of the three types of polio virus. 35 Booster shots 
are also necessary. Since the killed virus Salk vaccine does not 
immunize the intestinal tract of the vaccinee the virus can be passed 
to others.36 Thus, under the circumstances it was irrational to argue 
that a warning would have changed the mother's conduct. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the Conference 
of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) had submitted 
amici briefs to the Fifth Circuit arguing that individual warnings, 
if required, would undermine immunization programs. 37 These ar-
guments were rejected, just as the trial court had rejected similar 
arguments by the defendant's experts. 38 
What is disturbing about the court's decision is that the manufac-
turer was held liable, not the government agency that was super-
vised by physicians and supported by a legal system that mandates 
vaccination. Other courts have followed the Reyes court's reasoning, 
and have required the manufacturer to warn consumers even though 
it is the medical personnel in the clinics that have the real opportu-
nity to convey warnings. 39 In one case, however, the court at least 
required the plaintiff to establish that he would have refused to take 
the vaccine if an adequate warning had been given. 40 
It was, therefore, not unreasonable for the industry to conclude 
that the meaning of the Reyes case was that the plaintiff would win. 
34 Killed Salk vaccine is one in which the pathogen has been killed or inactivated, whereas 
the Sabin attenuated vaccine is one in which the pathogen's virulence has been decreased. 
The virus remains infectious for man but loses the ability to induce clinical disease. Both 
vaccines retain the ability to stimulate protective antibodies when the host is subsequently 
exposed to the disease. 
35 THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 211 (Berkow 14th ed. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Berkow]. 
36 498 F.2d at 1296. 
37 Neal Nathanson, Professor of Epidemiology at The Johns Hopkins University School of 
Public Health, was an expert witness for Wyeth. Professor Nathanson testified that a great 
majority of vaccinees receive their inoculations in mass administrations or county clinics 
manned at least in part by volunteers. 498 F.2d at 1277. 
38 498 F.2d at 1294-95. 
39 See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Stahlheber v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970). 
40 Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974). 
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This view was buttressed by other, less publicized, polio vaccine 
decisions that have almost always found the industry liable using a 
variety of legal theories. 41 In Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 
liability was based on express warranty.42 In Gottsdanker v. Cutter 
Laboratories,43 the basis of liability was implied warranty. Negli-
gence was the basis of liability in Griffin v. United States. 44 Failure 
to warn, however, remains the legal theory most likely to succeed. 
The developing case law made the industry very jittery and unwilling 
to produce the swine fiu vaccine without a substantial, government 
supplied, liability umbrella. 
The government had expected to accept the duty to warn require-
ment in the contracts it made with manufacturers. The government 
would then avoid liability by providing a legally adequate warning, 
as well as a legally adequate release from those being vaccinated. 
The manufacturers did not believe they could avoid liability, let alone 
the expense of defending law suits, through contract. The pharma-
ceutical industry wanted indemnification through legislation, but 
HEW was not amenable to such a plan. The insurance industry was 
concerned with liability, but it was even more concerned with the 
overhead costs of adjusting and adjudicating individual claims. The 
uncertainties about the program, such as who would get what type 
of vaccine, further complicated underwriting and made the risks 
unacceptable. While the government was optimistic over the swine 
fiu program, and was negotiating with four drug companies to pro-
duce the vaccine, the government was not negotiating with the 
pessimistic insurance companies. 
Congress responded to the insurance industry as if it was trying 
to cheat the pUblic. In June, 1976, the indemnification bill seemed 
unlikely to move. The insurance industry was adamantly against 
providing any insurance without it. On July 23, President Ford 
publicly advocated the passage of the legislation. On August 1, fate 
intervened. A new disease, named "Legionnaire's Disease", was 
discovered in Philadelphia. Press coverage was extensive. While this 
disease was not swine fiu, it created a climate that allowed the swine 
fiu bill to become law. 45 The bill sought to amend the Federal Tort 
41 See generally Comment, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for 
Failure to Warn, 29 VAND. L. REV. 235 (1976). 
42 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). 
43 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) . 
.. 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 353 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1973), afi'd in part, rev'd 
in part and remanded, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). 
45 NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 135. 
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Claims Act46 to permit suits against the federal government by those 
who might be injured by the vaccine. Manufacturers would be liable 
in subsequent indemnification suits by the government, but only if 
negligence was proved. 
The bill passed the Senate by voice vote. It was sent to the House 
and voted on with a no-amendment rule. There was not time to even 
give the members copies of the bill they were voting to pass. 47 It 
passed easily and was signed by President Ford on August 12, 1976.48 
The so-called "Swine Flu Act" became effective on October 1, 1976. 
Until then, the manufacturers and insurers refused to allow anyone 
to be vaccinated. On October 1, the mass vaccination program com-
menced in the states that had vaccine. In the first ten days, over a 
million Americans, not including children, received shots. 
On October 11, 1976, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, three people 
over age 70, with diagnosed cardiac problems, died shortly after 
receiving swine flu shots. The county suspended flu shots, and nine 
states followed its lead. The deaths received critical media attention 
despite CDC's explanation that, among people 70 to 74 years old, 
about 10 to 12 deaths per 100,000 occur every day. Thus, elderly 
people dying the day after vaccination is to be expected. On October 
14, President Ford was televised receiving his flu shot. Allegheny 
County and five states announced resumption of inoculations. 
By December 16, 1976, more than 40 million swine flu shots had 
been given. This was twice the number of inoculations ever given 
previously for an influenza virus in a single season. By November, 
it had been decided that children would receive two doses of the 
split vaccine, but there was only enough vaccine to vaccinate one 
child in twelve. Some small states immunized 80 per cent of their 
adults; other states only reached 10 per cent. 
It was in Minnesota, where nearly two-thirds of the eligible adults 
were immunized, that Guillain-Barre syndrome49 first appeared. 
Within a week, three more cases, one fatal, were discovered in the 
state. By then, CDC had learned of three more cases in Alabama 
and one in New Jersey. The unknown statistical relationship quickly 
led to the halting of the swine flu program. The decision to halt the 
program was made easier by the fact that swine flu had never 
appeared. On December 16, 1976 the program died, followed by a 
46 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1982). 
47 NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 135. 
48 Id. at 61. 
49 See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. 
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barrage of critical media commentary. Many in the media blamed 
politics, but after more thorough analysis, it was the government's 
professional health bureaucracy leadership, not politicians, that de-
served complete responsibility for the swine flu program. 
In January 1977, Jimmy Carter became President, and Joseph 
Califano, a Washington attorney, was appointed Secretary of HEW. 
At the end of January, Victoria flu appeared in Miami, Florida. Mr. 
Califano had to decide whether to release the existing stock of biv-
alent vaccine that protected against both swine flu and the common 
Victoria influenza. By then the risk of developing Guillain-Barre 
syndrome appeared to be eleven times greater for recipients of swine 
flu shots. The overall risk of developing Guillian-Barre was a remote 
one chance in 105,000 and the risk of death was 1 in 2 million among 
those vaccinated. However, there was no swine flu epidemic any-
where in the world, and, until the end of January, not even Victoria 
influenza in the United States. Mr. Califano assembled an advisory 
group, with members from outside the flu medical establishment, to 
present their conclusions. On February 7, 1977 they recommended 
the suspension of bivalent vaccine be lifted for high risk groups facing 
possible Victoria flu. The Secretary accepted the recommendation 
immediately. In March, a similar decision-making process ended the 
mass-inoculation swine flu program. 
The swine flu program left a continuing legacy. National commis-
sions made immunization policy. The federal government assumed 
most legal liability, and it played the major role in the immunization 
program. This program diminished the credibility of health profes-
sionals, and demonstrated their limited ability to perform accurate 
risk assessment. It also taught us that when the members of scien-
tific or medical professions play politics, their well-intentioned zeal 
does not guarantee desirable results. 
2. Tort Liability 
When the immunization program ended, the tort battle began. 
The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 made the 
United States the defendant in cases arising from swine flu vaccine. 50 
The swine flu vaccine was legally defined as vaccine against AlNew 
Jersey/76 (Hsw INl) influenza, or such a vaccine in combination with 
vaccine directed at AlVictoria/75. 51 The Act provided a remedy for 
50 42 U.S.C. § 2476(k)(2)(A) (1982). 
51 [d. at § 2 (j)(3). 
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claims brought within two years after the date the claim arose. 
Several provisions, however, provided for a tolling of the statute of 
limitations. 52 The Act gave protection to: (1) the manufacturers and 
distributors of swine flu vaccine; (2) public and private agencies or 
organizations that provided inoculations without charge for such 
vaccine or its administration and in compliance with the informed 
consent form and procedures; and (3) medical and other health per-
sonnel who provided or assisted in providing inoculations without 
charge. 53 The United States had an indemnification right against the 
program participants based on contract or negligence. 54 Suits could 
be brought in state or federal district court, but state court actions 
could be removed to the federal district court by the United States 
government. 55 The liability of the United States could be based on 
any theory of liability provided by the law of the state where the 
act or omission occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort, 
and breach of warranty. 56 The United States could also be liable 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) if the government was 
negligent. 57 The act made more than fifty sets of state product lia-
bility and malpractice laws applicable as well as FTCA law. 
The Act was upheld despite constitutional challenges based on 
claims alleging denial of due process, infringement of equal protec-
tion, violation of the right to jury trial, and intrusion on the Tenth 
Amendment. 58 By the summer of 1981, approximately 4,000 admin-
istrative claims had been filed, resulting in more than 1,500 suits in 
federal district courts. 59 The basis for most cases was Guillain-Barre 
syndrome, but other cases claimed a wide variety of injuries, includ-
ing neurological diseases and allergic reactions. 60 
III. GUILLAIN-BARRE SYNDROME LITIGATION 
Since the decline of poliomyelitis, Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) 
has emerged as the most frequent cause of acute or subacute severe, 
52 I d. at § 2 (k)(2). 
53 Id. at § 2 (k)(1). 
54 I d. at § 2 (k)(7). 
55 Id. at § 2 (k)(4)(B). 
56 I d. at § 2 (k)(2)(A). 
57 I d. at § 2 (k)(1)(B). 
58 Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411 (W.D.Okla. 1977). 
59 Rheingold & Shoemaker, The Swine Flu Litigation, 8 Litigation 28 (Fall 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as Rheingold & Shoemaker]. 
00 Id. 
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generalized human paralytic disease. 61 In the 1970's the etiology of 
this disease was unknown. 62 More recently, it is presumed to be the 
result of an immunologic attack on the peripheral nerves. 63 GBS is 
thought to be either a primary virus infection or a form of neuro-
allergy caused by either an antecedent illness or an immunizing 
injection. 64 It has followed diarrhea caused by water pollution,65 but 
GBS usually occurs after recovery from an infectious disease. Ex-
perts have also noted that it has " ... occurred as a rare complication 
of immunization with influenza vaccine. "66 
Diagnosis of GBS is difficult, and the criteria are not universally 
established. Over the years the criteria, originally proposed by Dr. 
Guillain and others in 1916, have been expanded to include manifes-
tations which other authors have thought belonged in this syn-
drome. 67 The syndrome involves bilateral muscle weakness. 68 
The severity of the illness varies considerably. If the patient sur-
vives the acute phase, the prognosis is good, and recovery is usually 
rapid and complete. During its acute phase, GBS mortality rates 
may reach 25 percent. Death is usually caused by respiratory and 
vasomotor paralysis. 69 The treatment is symptomatic and support-
ive, with emphasis on complete nursing care in an intensive hospital 
setting. 70 
When the swine flu inoculation program began, the consent forms 
did not mention Guillain-Barre Syndrome as a risk. The syndrome 
61 Saffer, Feldman & Alter, Epidemiology of Guilla in-Barre Syndrome, 28 NEUROLOGY 686 
(1978). 
62 LUCKMANN & SORENSEN, MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING 680 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as LUCKMANN & SORENSEN]. 
63 Berkow, supra note 35, at 1386. But see THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND 
THERAPY 1361 (Holvey 12 ed. 1972) (concluding that the etiology was unknown) [hereinafter 
cited as Holvey]. 
64 Melnick & Flewett, Role of Infection in the Guillain-Barre Syndrome, 27 J. NEUROL. 
NEUROSURG. PSYCHIAT. 395 (1964). 
66 Silman, Outbreak of Guillain-Barre Syndrome Associated with Water Pollution, 1 BR. 
MED. J. 751 (1978). 
66 MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (N.B. the 5th ed. did not define Guillain-Barre 
syndrome). 
67 Masucci & Krutzke, Diagnostic Criteria for the Guillain-Barre Syndrome, 13 J. NEUROL. 
SCI. 483 (1971). 
66 The syndrome involves bilateral muscle weakness of the lower motor neuron type, with 
or without cranial nerve or sensory abnormalities, acute or subacute onset and evolution of 
signs and symptoms, and absence of other conditions such as diabetes mellitus, alcoholism, 
neoplasia, etc. Holvey, supra note 63, at 1361. 
69 Vasomotor paralysis involves the failure of the nerves having muscular control of the 
blood vessel walls. 
70 See LUCKMANN & SORENSEN, supra note 62, at 680-81. 
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was a disease whose cause was unknown, and no causal relationship 
between the vaccine and GBS had been demonstrated. Although 
nearly twenty million doses of influenza vaccine had been given in 
the United States each year for twenty years, the reported incidence 
of G BS following influenza vaccination was almost nonexistent.71 One 
report reviewing 1,100 cases of GBS found one case related to vac-
cination. 72 Another study reported one case of GBS following vacci-
nation by a different vaccine, but concluded that there was no way 
to prove or to disprove the etiologic relationship.73 Moreover, anal-
ysis of the small number of cases of GBS following any type of 
vaccination would be inadequate without reference to the fact that 
fifty-eight to eighty percent of GBS patients had some type of infec-
tion prior to the onset of the syndrome. Prior to 1976, the incidence 
rate of GBS was one or two cases per 400 million vaccinations and, 
therefore, statistically insignificant. 74 
When the swine flu program began, CDC established a surveil-
lance system that was more sophisticated than anything ever before 
attempted by the public health community. A center, operational 24 
hours a day, used the best technology and the best computer hard-
ware available to track the program. 75 Later, the program was crit-
icized for being set up more to collect data than to rapidly deal with 
the dangers created by the vaccine. 76 The careful collection of data 
did permit useful post-mortem analysis of the program. 
By December 15, 1977, preliminary data indicated that the inci-
dence of GBS among those who received the swine flu vaccine was 
approximately seven times greater than among those not vaccinated. 
These apparent associations were what ultimately resulted in the 
suspension of the swine flu program on December 16, 1976 and the 
expansion, nation-wide, of GBS surveillance. 77 The period of primary 
increased risk of GBS lasts five weeks after vaccination, although 
cases can occur for nine or ten weeks. The surveillance uncovered 
532 GBS patients who had recently received influenza vaccinations 
and fifteen patients who had been vaccinated after the onset of GBS. 
71 Morgenstern & White, Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination, 9 LAW MED. 




75 See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 34. 
76Id. See also supra note 1. 
77 Schonberger, Bregmann, et. al., Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination In The 
National Influenza Immunization Program, United States, 1976-1977, 110 AM. J. EPIDE-
MIOL. 105 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schonberger & Bergmann]. 
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The attack rates for recipients of monovalent and bivalent vaccines 
were not significantly different. The elevated attack rate existed in 
every age group. Furthermore, no single manufacturer's vaccine was 
related to a significantly different rate of CBS. The estimated at-
tributable risk of vaccine-related CBS was one case per 100,000 
vaccinations. There were fifty-eight fatalities reported during the 
time of surveillance. 78 During the six-week risk period, the number 
of cases that can be attributed to the vaccine ranged from 211 to 
246; the number is slightly higher if the risk period is considered to 
run for eight weeks.79 At the termination of the vaccination program 
in December 1976, approximately 40 million Americans had partici-
pated. 
By early 1977, the cases became so numerous that the Judicial 
Panel on Multi-District Litigation ordered the consolidation of all 
the swine flu cases for pretrial discovery in the District Court for 
the District of Columbia. 80 Since the government produced 50,000 
documents during pretrial discovery, the thousands of plaintiffs 
elected fourteen law firms to serve as a Swine Flu Litigation Steer-
ing Committee. 81 
By April 1985, the number of claims had climbed to 4,165; 278 of 
these were already settled, and the government considered 413 of 
these "denied and settled". 82 The settled cases cost the government 
$6,715,519 and the cases deemed denied and settled cost the gov-
ernment $35,208,225. 83 The total cost was $41,923,744 for the swine 
flu claims. 84 Approximately two thirds (2,813) of the claims have 
been denied. 85 
In all, 1,604 law suits were filed, and 706 have been dismissed. 
The government settled 372 cases for $35,208,225. There have been 
judgments in 52 cases, where liability was stipulated, that have 
totaled $16,999,856. Where liability was contested, the government 
won 259 out of the 307 cases tried, resulting in an 84 percent win 
78Id. 
79 Langmuir, Bregmann, et. al., Epidemiologic & Clinical Evaluation of Guillain-Barre 
Syndrome Reported In Association With The Administration Of Swine Influenza Vaccines, 
119 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 841 (1984). Breman & Hayner, Guillain-Barre Syndrome And Its 
Relationship To Swine Injiu8nza Vaccination In Michigan, 1976-1977, 119 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 
880 (1984). 
80 Rheingold & Shoemaker, supra note 59. 
81Id. 
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rate for the government. The 48 cases, which the government lost, 
cost $24,310,114, resulting in an average cost of over half a million 
dollars per case. There are 167 cases still pending. The total amount 
paid by the government, as of April 1985, was $83,233,714 plus the 
costs of administering the claims and law suits and the judicial costs 
of handling the law suits. 86 The original cost of the swine flu program 
was estimated at $134 million, of which $100 million was for vaccine. 
The legal costs appear to have almost reached the vaccine cost. 
The GBS litigation provides an important lesson for health policy 
makers. Epidemiological analysis, even well after the end of the 
swine flu program, showed an increase in GBS of at most twelve 
times the incidence in those not vaccinated. However, because the 
incidence was low, even among those vaccinated, only one person 
for each 83,000 Americans would get GBS due to the swine flu 
program.87 However, much of this evidence, from a legal perspective, 
is of little value in avoiding tort liability. Significant evidence indi-
cates that, for ten weeks after receiving a swine flu inoculation, the 
occurrence of GBS in the vaccinee is more likely to be due to the 
vaccine than to other factors.88 A more conservative estimate is that 
for five weeks after vaccination, the vaccine is the most likely cause 
of GBS. This lower estimate is derived from the argument that the 
background rate89 of thirty-two cases per week, that was used in the 
earlier studies, was too low, and that fifty-six cases per week is a 
more accurate background rate. This change in assumptions results 
in a much lower number of GBS cases that can be related to vaccine. 90 
For plaintiffs' lawyers, the chance of recovering for a GBS case 
occurring within five weeks after vaccination is nearly absolute. For 
cases occurring within ten weeks of vaccination, the chance of re-
covery is almost as high, because the government has been willing 
to settle almost all cases where GBS was contracted within ten weeks 
of a swine flu shot. 91 Such settlement offers were based on a study 
86 Id. 
87 Morgenstern & White, Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination, 9 LAW MED. 
J. 465 (1981). 
88 Langmuir, Guillain-Barre Syndrome: The Swine Influenza Virus Vaccine Incident in the 
United States of America, 1976-77: Preliminary Communication, 72 J. ROYAL Soc. MED. 
660 (1979). See also Franklin & Mais, supra note 30. 
89 Without a swine flu program, there will be thirty-two new cases per week in the United 
States from other causes. 
90 See Greenstreet, Estimation of the Probability that Guillain-Barre Syndrome Was 
Caused by the Swine Flu Vaccine: U.S. Experience (1976-77), 24 MED. SCI. LAW 61, 66 
(1984). 
91 Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
732, 774 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Black & Lilienfeld). 
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by Schonberger and others.92 Thus, the swine fiu statute93 provides 
for recovery for nearly all persons, regardless of individual causality 
who have had GBS within ten weeks following an inoculation. 
While causation can be a significant problem for a plaintiff's at-
torney, it was not a major problem for GBS victims who developed 
GBS during the appropriate time period. Occasionally courts have 
disregarded scientific evidence and awarded damages for GBS which 
developed more than ten weeks after the vaccination. For example, 
in Sulesky v. United States,94 a victim of GBS recovered damages 
even though the disease first manifested three months after the 
injection. In Cook v. United States,95 the GBS plaintiff first exhibited 
the disease twelve weeks after the inoculation. 
Although the plaintiff who becomes ill within 10 weeks of inocu-
lation avoids one causation problem, there are other medical and 
legal causation problems which must be addressed. In fact, proof of 
causation is often the biggest headache for plaintiffs' attorneys in 
toxic tort cases. 96 The major causation issue found in GBS cases is 
whether the disease is in fact GBS and therefore subject to being 
caused by an inoculation. The problem is created because the symp-
toms of the disease are amorphous. A diagnosis may be a physician's 
judgment that would not be universally accepted. It has been pointed 
out in a swine fiu context what most litigators know all too well: 
witnesses can be found to testify to almost anything. 97 This permits 
nonmeritorious cases to go forward, and if in the hands of a fuzzy-
minded judge, bizarre decisions can follow. 
Only 16 percent of the litigated cases have been won by plaintiffs. 98 
However, the stakes are high, and the uncertain outcome is enough 
of a crap-shoot to encourage the gamble of a trial to verdict. Fur-
thermore, given the uncertainty surrounding swine fiu reactions, 
some of the more peculiar swine fiu decisions that favor plaintiffs 
may have been correctly decided. But the legal literature is replete 
with swine fiu cases that strain scientific credulity. 99 
92 See Schonberger & Bergmann, supra note 77. 
93 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
94 545 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. W. Va. 1982). 
95 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
96 Rosenberg, The Causal Connection In Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855-59 (1984). 
97 See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 91. 
98 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
99 In Grubbs v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ind. 1984), a GBS onset five months 
after inoculation resulted in a $721,040 damage award. In Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 
1517 (10th Cir. 1984), an award of $333,431 was given for transverse myelitis. In Heath v. 
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The swine flu litigation is coming to an end, but its legal legacy 
threatens the many inoculation programs upon which public health 
- world wide - is dependent. The ability of our society to develop 
new vaccines to fend off current and emerging diseases is also threat-
ened. Furthermore, the increasing legal requirements imposed on 
those giving vaccinations, such as the warning requirements,100 are 
only one aspect of the overall trend in products liability favoring 
plaintiffs. The decline of the state-of-the-art defense could remove 
the ability of vaccine manufacturers to avoid liability for unknowable 
side effects. 101 While this affirmative defense may still be more ap-
plicable in a drug case than in most product liability cases,102 few 
vaccine manufacturers today would be willing to believe that courts 
would not hold them strictly liable. 103 However, in the swine flu 
context, the overwhelming majority of courts seem to have compen-
sated GBS victims who were made ill by the swine flu vaccine (at 
least, to the extent that our limited knowledge of the etiology and 
incidence of the GBS disease allows). The outer limits of product 
liability theory were not considered because recovery was based on 
statute. 
The costs of the swine flu program, while substantial, were not 
unreasonable on a per shot basis. The $134 million federal program, 
with some locally incurred costs, provided 40 million vaccinations. 104 
The cost was under $4 per shot. The compensation costs to date of 
United States, No. 77F1113 (D. Colo. 1980), a structured settlement with an estimated 
payment of $1.2 million was made to a plaintiff who contracted encephalomyelitis (a viral 
inflammation of the brain) after receiving a swine flu injection. In Titchnell v. United States, 
No. 78-86 (W.D. Pa. 1981), a 71 year old man suffered a stroke within one day of receiving a 
swine flu vaccination. Medical experts testified that, if a medical history had been taken, the 
clinic personnel would have known that, because of his prior history of stroke, the plaintiff 
should have been lying down when he received the shot. The plaintiff received $147,400 plus 
$22,158 for medical expenses. His wife received $50,000 for loss of consortium. In Hasler v. 
United States, 517 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Mich, 1981), a woman suffered crippling arthritis ten 
days after receiving a swine flu inoculation. Defendant's expert testified that the plaintiff 
suffered from Still's disease (juvenile rheumatoid arthritis) the cause of which is not known. 
Plaintiff's experts testified she suffered from a rheumatoid disorder, with symptoms additional 
to those found in a normal case of Still's disease, and that they arose as an immunological 
reaction to the swine flu shot. She recovered $1.5 million. In another case involving rheumatoid 
arthritis, however, the court rejected the claim and stated that the overwhelming weight of 
medical literature opposed a theory that associated swine flu vaccine with the plaintiff's 
injuries. Gicas v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 
100 See e.g., Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th. Cir. 1984). 
101 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). 
102 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). 
103 Darnell & Placitella, The Beshada Case, How Has It Affected the Defense of Toxic Torts, 
20 TRIAL 52 (Nov. 1984). 
104 NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 10, at 68. 
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$83,233,714 are approximately $2 per inoculation. 105 If legal, admin-
istration costs and the costs to complete the pending 167 cases are 
included, the total compensation costs are likely to range between 
$2 to $5 per inoculation. The most probable figure is about $3 per 
shot. Thus, the federal government spent approximately $7 per shot. 
Should society accept the public health benefit of inoculations and 
not compensate its victims? In a just society, the answer should be 
no. The difficult issue, however, is whether a better compensation 
system can be developed. The controversy continues today, and is 
focused on the DPT program. 
IV. THE DIPTHERIA, PERTUSSIS, TETANUS PROGRAM 
The Diptheria, Pertussis, Tetanus ("DPT") controversy arises 
amidst claims that the United States manufacturers do not produce 
the best or safest vaccines; that information concerning their safety 
is sometimes withheld from the public; and that the federal moni-
toring of immunization reactions is unlikely to detect a bad batch of 
vaccine. That this controversy should arise over such an "apple pie 
and motherhood" program causes significant concern. In the United 
States, diptheria and tetanus toxoid are usually incorporated with 
pertussis vaccine to produce DPT vaccine. It is the pertussis com-
ponent, aimed at preventing whooping cough, that is the subject of 
the current concern. 
In the 16th century in Europe, whooping cough was responsible 
for thousands of deaths. Until the last few decades, it remained a 
major cause of early childhood mortality.106 Today, recovery is com-
mon due to better medical care, but the disease is still considered a 
severe one. Some victims have serious sequelae including central 
nervous system damage. After vaccination for this disease became 
wide spread, there was a sharp decrease in the disease.107 In recent 
years, the disease incidence has been increasing in England and 
other developed countries where vaccination rates declined due to 
widely publicized accounts of brain damage believed to have been 
caused by the vaccine. 108 
105 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
106 Miller, Alderslade & Ross, Whooping Cough and Whooping Cough Vaccine: The Risks 
and Benefits Debate, 4 EPIDEMIOL. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Miller, Alderslade & 
Ross]. 
107 Vaccine Injury Compensation, 1984, Hearings on S.5810 Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
157 (1984). 
108 The reported serious reactions fall into three groups: (1) shock that is occassionally lethal 
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The reaction of the medical community to the DPT controversy 
has been to stress that the medical complications from whooping 
cough, in the absence of an immunization program, would be far 
greater than the medical problems traceable to the vaccine. 109 How-
ever, rational medical judgment is hampered by the scarcity of re-
liable data. Neither the incidence of the disease pertussis, nor the 
rates of adverse reactions, are established by reliable information. 
Cases of pertussis go unrecognized by physicians because the disease 
can be difficult to identify from clinical symptoms, and, even if 
recognized, it is not always reported. Verification of the infection by 
isolation of the organism requires culture methods not used routinely 
in many diagnostic laboratories; serologic testing is not feasible for 
routine diagnosis. For children who have been vaccinated, the dis-
ease may be diagnosed as bronchitis because the characteristic 
"whoop" will often not be present, and physicians assume that vac-
cination will have prevented whooping cough. 110 
The incidence of vaccination complications is also subject to un-
certainty because of the questionable nature of available data. Pri-
vate physicians, who administer half the DPT shots in the United 
States, are not required to report adverse reactions. Even if a 
physician wishes to report a reaction, there is no single data collec-
tion agency. If such information is sent to the vaccine manufacturer, 
it must be maintained in a complaint file for one year. The file must 
be accessible to the FDA. The doctor might send a report to the 
state's health department, which is supposed to forward it to CDC's 
Monitoring System for Illness Following Immunization (MSIFI) or 
the information might be sent directly to CDC. However, the only 
doctors who are required to use the MSIFI system are doctors in 
public health clinics. Even this system fails to generate accurate 
data because the system depends on voluntary reporting by par-
ents.ll1 Furthermore, some states only forward reports to CDC if 
and similar to the sudden infant death syndrome (SmS) (though a relationship between sms 
and the vaccine has not been established); (2) febrile seizures which seem to appear at a 
elevated rate in the first two weeks after a DPT immunization; (3) infantile spasms, noninfec-
tious encephalopathy, prolonged convulsions and possibly Reye's syndrome (this last problem, 
however, is not generally accepted as a DPT reaction. Severe brain damage can result, followed 
by death in many cases). See Miller, Alderslade & Ross, supra note 106. 
109 Koplan, Schoenbaum, Weinstein & Fraser, Pertussis Vaccine - An Analysis of Benefits, 
Risks and Costs, 301 NEW ENG. J. OF M. 906 (1979). 
110 NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCI., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NEW VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 
ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES, 172, (1985) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCI.l. 
111 Parents seeking vaccination for their children receive a consent form. At the bottom of 
the form is a telephone number and instructions to call if the child gets sick in the four weeks 
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the child is hospitalized. Thus, the extent of under reporting is 
unknown. Though half of the DPT shots are administered by private 
physicians, less than ten percent of the MSIFI data comes from this 
source.n2 
The ubiquitous DPT vaccination program has been subject to al-
most no studies to evaluate adverse reactions. The studies that have 
been undertaken are flawed. The medical establishment usually 
claims an incidence of adverse reaction as 1 case per 110,000 injec-
tions and the incidence of serious disorders, such as encephalopathy 
with persistent neurological dysfunction one year later as 1 case in 
310,000 injections. 113 Fatal reactions are established to be 1 to 2 
cases per 10 million injections. 114 Most estimates are based on the 
work of Miller in Great Britain115 and the federally funded study 
made by UCLA School of Medicine in 1978 and 1979. 116 The British 
studies involve a different vaccine than is used in the United States 
as the British vaccine has a potency of about one half of the World 
Health Organization standard.117 The British sacrificed vaccine ef-
fectiveness in order to obtain increased safety.118 As Miller states, 
[b]ecause of the broad nature of both the underlying assumptions 
and the wide confidence limits of the derived risk ratios, these 
estimates must be interpreted with extreme caution and cannot 
be regarded as precise measures. 119 
The United States' study120 is addressed to the American vaccine, 
but it is also flawed. The study did not include children who had 
previously experienced adverse reactions to DPT shots. Yet, as the 
cases discussed later will show, in the real world many children with 
contraindications are vaccinated. The study also fails to identify the 
number of children involved. Instead all data is given in terms of 
shots. Since the recommended immunization schedule is to get four 
after vaccination. If the parent telephones, clinic personnel are supposed to fiU out a form and 
send it to CDC. 
112 COULTER & FISHER, DPT: A SHOT IN THE DARK, 149 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 
COULTER & FISHER]. 
113 See NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCI. supra note 110, at 173. 
114Id. 
115 See Miller, Alderslade & Ross, supra note 106. 
116 Cody & Baraff, Nature and Rate of Adverse Reactions Associated with DPT and DT 
Immunizations In Infants and Children, 68 PEDIATRICS 650 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Cody & Baraff]. 
117 See Miller, Alderslade & Ross, supra note 106, at 6. 
118 In addition, the number of children participating in the British field trials was insufficient 
to detect rare reactions. 
119 See Miller, Alderslade & Ross, supra note 106, at 19. 
120 See Cody & Baraff, supra note 116. 
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DPT inoculations between the age of two months and eighteen 
months, with a booster shot before entering school,121 risk statistics 
based on shots significantly underestimate the risk to children who 
receive multiple shots. Thus, the UCLA study underestimates the 
risk to children by a factor greater than two, assuming about 7000 
children were involved. 122 The study placed a forty-eight hour limit 
within which reactions had to occur to be included in the study. 123 
Two infants died within four days of the shot, but the 48 hour 
restriction allowed the report to state, "no sequelae were detected 
following reactions". Eighteen children had convulsions or hypotonic 
hyporesponsive episodes, but there was no follow-up to determine 
whether long-term damage resulted. Unusual high-pitched crying 
was not considered a major reaction, yet children with that reaction 
were not given further pertussis vaccine. 124 Cases that follow show 
that public health workers or physicians frequently vaccinate and 
injure such children. One must recognize that since most American 
children have had DPT shots, it is very difficult to get a baseline 
against which to evaluate the effect of the vaccine. It is also difficult 
to run clinical studies in light of ethical concerns for the human 
involved. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that any national policy 
that emerges concerning the DPT vaccination program will be based 
upon poor data concerning both the incidence of the disease and the 
adverse reactions to its vaccine. 
The UCLA study concluded that local reactions to the vaccine 
occurred in 64 percent of the DPT vaccine recipients, and minor 
systemic reactions occurred in 50 percent. A control group that 
received only DT immunization experienced less-frequent and less-
severe reactions. Convulsions and hypotonic hyporesponsive 125 ep-
isodes occurred in one of every seventeen hundred and fifty immu-
nizations, though no one in the study developed encephalopathy or 
permanent brain damage within the forty-eight hour period used in 
the study. 126 
A strong public reaction to the perceived adverse effects of DPT 
vaccination has been developing, despite continued assurances from 
the medical community that the benefits of vaccination far outweigh 
121 See Holvey, supra note 63, at 61. 
122 See COULTER & FISHER, supra note 112, at 245. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. 
125 See Cody & Baraff, supra note 116. 
126 [d. 
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the risks. 127 These reactions have led to an increase in the frequency 
of law suits and efforts to change the laws mandating vaccination. 
In Sweden, England, Wales, and Japan the rate of DPT vaccination 
has decreased, or the vaccine's potency has been reduced, because 
of the public's fear of severe reactions. 128 In these countries the 
incidence of the disease pertussis has been increasing. 129 Health 
professionals in the United States fear a similar pattern could de-
velop in this country. 
Law suits following DPT vaccine have become common. 130 Such 
suits are brought against the vaccine manufacturer, the health care 
provider, or both. Suits against the manufacturer can only be pros-
ecuted with great difficulty based on a claimed defect in the vaccine. 
One explanation, discussed above, is the lack of good data to dem-
onstrate the risk of injury. Another explanation is that existing data 
is held by the government or by the manufacturers, and neither are 
required to cooperate in providing such data to litigants. 131 Conse-
quently, a claim against the manufacturer, in reported cases, is 
usually based on an alleged defect in labeling. 
Suits brought against the health care providers based on medical 
malpractice claims require proof that acceptable medical care was 
not provided. 132 Such proof usually involves the existence of a con-
traindication, or a condition in the patient where administration of 
the vaccine would be precluded by prudent medical care standards. 
Three parties bear responsibility for informing physicians when not 
to vaccinate: the manufacturers of vaccine; the American Academy 
of Pediatrics (AAP); and the United States Public Health Service 
(PHS). The most important standard is the AAP's Committee on 
Infectious Diseases report called the "Red Book". It is the standard 
used by private physicians. The PHS's Advisory Committee on Im-
munization Practices (ACIP) makes recommendations for physicians 
in public health clinics. These are published by CDC in the Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report. 
127 See supra notes 109-10; 116 and accompanying text. 
128 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PERTUSSIS SURVEILLANCE, 1979-1981, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL, PERTUSSIS - ENGLAND AND WALES 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REPORT 333 (July 2, 1982) 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, 629 
(Dec. 3, 1982). See fllso NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 110. 
129Id. 
130 See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text. 
131 97th Cong., 2d Sess., May 7, 1982 (testimony of Marge Grant). 
132 See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. 
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There are some inconsistencies among the guidelines, but all 
groups agree further pertussis vaccination is contraindicated if pre-
vious reactions to the vaccine included: high fever, convulsions, en-
cephalitis, collapse, shock, or focal neurological signs. High-pitched 
screaming or somnolence is a probable contraindication in the "Red 
Book," but is an absolute bar according to both the ACIP and the 
manufacturers. A history of convulsions in the child or the immediate 
family is a contraindication in West Germany, East Germany, Japan, 
and England, but is not usually listed in the American guidelines. 133 
It is against this medical background that law suits should be eval-
uated. 
In Holcomb v. United States,134 the plaintiff received a series of 
DPT shots in army clinics and then suffered encephalopathy.135 The 
parents brought suit against the United States under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act and against Richard-Merrell, the vaccine manufac-
turer. The government settled for $390,000, Richard-Merrell con-
tributed $210,000. 136 
In Wilson v. United States,137 Air Force physicians gave a DPT 
shot to a child who had severe reactions to previous DPT inocula-
tions. The adverse reaction left the child permanently, severely 
retarded. The suit was brought under the FTCA and the plaintiff 
agreed to a structured settlement with a present value of $2,299,948. 
In Piefer v. Devitt,138 a pediatrician gave a third DPT shot to a 
child who had adverse reactions to the first and second shots. The 
plaintiff suffered febrile reactions and convulsions that left the child 
mentally retarded, requiring 24 hour care. A jury awarded the plain-
tiff $3.05 million. 
In Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 139 a jury in Boise, Idaho awarded 
nearly $1.2 million to the parents of a child who developed transverse 
myelitis,140 allegedly as a result of a DPT shot. According to the 
plaintiff's lawyer, the case turned on whether Lederle's vaccine was 
133 See COULTER & FISHER, supra note 112, at 190. 
134 No. 79-2376, (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 15, 1982). 
135 Encephalopathy is any dysfunction of the brain. 
136 Holcomb, supra note 134. 
137 No. C80-1325A, (N.D. Ga. July 9, 1982). 
138 No. 590-343 (Mil. Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. I, 1984). 
139 Tarr, DPT Vaccine Injuries: Who Should Pay?, NAT'L. LAW JOURNAL 1 (April 1, 1985) 
[hereinafter cited as Tarr]. 
140 Transverse myelitis is an inflamation of the spinal cord. Death may result in a few days 
from upward extension and involvement of respiratory muscles. 
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as safe as another vaccine, Tri-Solgen, which was manufactured by 
Eli Lilly. That case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.141 
In Tom v. Wyeth Laboratories,142 a brain-damaged girl received a 
settlement of $7.5 million from a private doctor and Wyeth Labo-
ratories. In Morris v. Parke, Davis & CO.,143 the plaintiff suffered 
irreversible brain damage as a result of a DPT shot. Since the 
plaintiff was unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the vac-
cine, the suit was brought against five pharmaceutical companies 
which produced a substantial share of the DPT vaccine marketed in 
1965 on a market share theory of liability. Ruling on a pretrial 
motion, the court held that, if the plaintiffs proved causation and 
could show that one or more of the defendants marketed the drug 
with conscious disregard for the health of consumers, then the plain-
tiffs will be entitled to recover punitive damages from each defen-
dant. 
It has been reported that there have been an estimated 150 law-
suits involving pertussis vaccine. 144 Plaintiffs are seeking $1.5 billion 
in damages. Industry is settling most of these cases as a large 
corporation is unlikely to win before a jury when a very sick child 
is the plaintiff. The industry claims the financial impact is substan-
tial,145 and vaccine manufacturers are leaving the field. In 1963, eight 
drug companies made the DPT vaccine. In 1984, there were only 
two U. S. companies left. In 1986, Lederle Laboratories is the only 
manufacturer left because Wyeth Laboratories stopped production, 
citing rising liability problems. Two state health departments, Mich-
igan and Massachusetts, make their own vaccine. 146 In addition, a 
Canadian company, Connaught Laboratories, distributes a more ex-
pensive vaccine through E.R. Squibb & Co. Connaught stated it 
might stop distribution too, but seems to have stayed in the mar-
ket. 147 The mix of who within the industry is producing each type of 
141 Tarr, supra note 139. 
142Id. 
143 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
144 Damage Lawsuits Settled For Millions, The Fresno Bee, reprinted in DPT (Dec. 1984). 
145 It is not easy to obtain a truly accurate picture of the fate of plaintiffs who sue for alleged 
DPT Vaccination injuries. Both industry (which seeks to avoid liability through federal leg-
islation) and plaintiffs' lawyers, have a vested interest in publicizing large damage awards. 
There is, however, no overall source of information on the disposition of DPT cases filed. This 
is different from the swine fiu example where the government is always the defendant. Claims 
against individual medical health providers are even more difficult to identify than the claims 
involving manufacturers. 
146 Pertussis Liability Cited, Firm Ceases Making Vaccine, Washington Post, June 19, 
1984, at 11, col. 1. 
147 Connaught removed DPT from its price list and limited its distribution to existing large 
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vaccine is rather volatile, but overall the industry is in a state of 
decline. Because of the costs of litigation, it is claimed, the price of 
the vaccine jumped from 12 cents to $2.80 per dose. 
Whether the manufacturers of vaccine are permanently leaving 
the field, or are orchestrating a program to encourage Congress to 
relieve them of liability is difficult to determine. The president of 
Lederle Laboratories has testified before Congress that the total 
dollar demand of DPT lawsuits against them is 200 times greater 
than the total sales of DPT vaccine in 1983.148 Wyeth Laboratories 
which left the market because of "extreme liability exposure, cost 
of litigation and the difficulty of continuing to obtain adequate 
insurance"149 is continuing to produce vaccine, but it is distributed 
under the Lederle label. Wyeth sells the vaccine to Lederle at 20 
cents a dose and Lederle charges $2.80 a dose to its customers but 
assumes litigation costS. 150 Since these private corporations are not 
required to provide financial records for review, it is difficult to 
determine whether this sharp price increase is for political, legal, or 
business reasons (or a mix of all of them). 151 
The litigation concerning DPT vaccination would diminish if a safer 
vaccine was developed. Unfortunately, for many reasons, the chance 
of this happening is small. The most important reason is that the 
medical establishment does not consider DPT vaccination reactions 
to be a serious problem. Physicians refer to the studies discussed 
earlier in this article, and conclude that the benefits of vaccination 
far outweigh the risks. The epidemics of whooping cough that have 
developed in Japan and in the United Kingdom are frequently cited 
to support this position. 152 The American Academy of Pediatrics 
estimates a serious permanent neurological disorder will follow one 
out of every 310,000 DPT vaccinations. l53 Including mUltiple inocu-
lations, about 15 million doses are given in the United States each 
contracts with public health departments and hospitals. However, by May 1985, Connaught 
seemed to be actively back in the market. Sun, The Vexing Problems of Vaccine Compensa-
tions, 227 SCIENCE 1012 (March 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Sunl. 
148 Vaccine Injury Compensation, Hearings on H.R.5810, before the Subcomm. On Health 
And The Environment of the Committee On Energy And Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
229 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Hearingsl. 
149Id. 
150 Id. at 295. 
151 For material demonstrating the complexity of vaccine pricing, see Oversight of Immu-
nization Cost, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations And General Oversight of the 
Comm. On Labor And Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
1982 Hearings]. 
152 See Sun, supra note 147. 
153 See 1984 Hearings supra note 148, at 73. 
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year. Still, the AAP supports vaccination, on the grounds that per-
tussis, the disease, produces ten times the rate of brain damage as 
the DPT vaccine, and other complications are more common for the 
disease as well. 154 The National Academy of Science (N AS) estimates 
the risk from DPT to be 1-2 fatalities in 10 million injections and 
serious neurological dysfunction one year later to be 1 in 310,000 
injections. 155 These estimates, however, are projected on the basis 
of the flawed studies discussed above. Perhaps for this reason the 
NAS recommends an improved vaccine. 156 
What vaccine is available to American consumers is not deter-
mined by health considerations alone, but is dependent as well upon 
business decisions made by companies whose profit incentive may 
sometimes conflict with their health protection goals. To put it an-
other way, the nation may be unwilling to pay the costs necessary 
to produce a safer vaccine. Thus, manufacturers may have the tech-
nology to produce better vaccine, but the market will not support a 
price high enough to allow them to do it. 
For example, one DPT vaccine, Tri-Solgen, existed on the United 
States' market more than twenty years ago, but in 1975, Eli Lilly & 
Company, its manufacturer, stopped producing it. 157 Tri-Solgen sold 
well, but was dropped because it was not profitable enough. 158 Merck 
& Company developed two promising experimental partial-cell vac-
cines but never marketed them. 159 They later patented another pro-
cess for making partial-cell DPT vaccine, but never marketed it 
either. 160 
The issue of profit is a complex one too. The vaccine market is an 
international one; vaccine is bought and sold at a fraction of the 
United States' price. Furthermore there is excess industrial capacity 
in the international production of biologicals which limits their prof-
itability.161 International buyers are price sensitive, so they negotiate 
contracts through organizations, such as the Pan American Health 
Organization, to get the lowest price possible. 162 Thus, a substantial 
154 Silberner, DPT Vaccine: Weighing the Risk, Washington Post Health Supplement, March 
27, 1985, at 7. 
155 Leeper, Which Disease? What Vaccine? How to Set Priorities, News Report, NAT'L. 
ACADEMY OF SCI., Dec. 1984-Jan. 1985, at 4. 
156 [d. 
157 Collins & Hanchette, The DPT Saga: Putting Profits Over Progress, reprinted in Special 




161 See 1982 Hearings, supra note 151, at 33 (testimony of Mr. Umstead). 
162 [d. at 9 (testimony of Dr. Cooney). 
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American investment in development of a new vaccine would be 
risky if the vaccine's cost would not be acceptable to foreign pur-
chasers. 
To produce an improved DPT vaccine would take five years; the 
cost of development would be about $20 million and there would be 
an estimated 90 percent probability of success. 163 Some time and 
about half the cost could be saved if the Japanese acellular vaccine, 
used in Japan since 1980 and now being reviewed, could be approved 
for use in the United States. 164 A major problem for any new vaccine 
will stem from clinical trials. It will be difficult to find a meaningful 
control group because the incidence of the disease in the United 
States is so low. However, it would be unethical to use a placebo on 
a control group, because an effective and generally safe vaccine 
already exists. In order to have a new vaccine licensed, alternative 
testing methods that would be legally acceptable to NIAID may 
have to be developed. 165 
Whether a new vaccine is developed will most likely depend on 
the political pressures that build in the coming years. Both the 
manufacturers and the medical establishment argue that the existing 
vaccine is effective, inexpensive, and has few adverse effects. The 
National Academy of Science study,166 outlining priorities for new 
vaccine development, offered recommendations based on a series of 
assumptions concerning available development funds. Under no as-
sumption was pertussis ranked among the five diseases that would 
be best targets for new vaccine development. At the same time, 
however, the report recognized that the side effects of DPT vacci-
nation may cause a widespread misconception about the risks and 
benefits of other vaccination programs. Therefore, a small reduction 
in morbidity and mortality might be justified in this case when public 
health priorities are set. 167 As will be made clear in the material 
below, even the National Academy of Science understands the need 
to grease a squeaking wheel. 
The problems associated with the DPT vaccine have led to exten-
sive lobbying efforts to enact new legislation. The major citizen 
group involved in this issue is DPT(Dissatisfied Parents Together),I68 
located in the Washington, D.C. area. This organization is run pri-
marily by parents whose children were adversely affected by DPT 
163 See NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra note 110, at 178. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. 
166 Morgenstern & White, supra note 72, at 129. 
167 See NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra note 110, at 124. 
168 The address for Dissatisfied Parents Together is: 128 Branch Road, Vienna, Va., 22180. 
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shots. They argue that physicians, scientists, drug manufacturers, 
and federal health agencies have known for years that DPT vaccine 
causes severe neurological damage, and that death occurs in an 
unknown number of children. 169 They have challenged much of the 
data used to support HHS's position favoring DPT inoculation. 170 
Dissatisfied Parents Together does not advise parents to refuse 
DPT shots for their children. It does advise parents to ensure that 
the person giving the shots gets a complete medical history including 
information about neurological diseases and siblings' experience with 
the disease. The group warns that the child should be healthy when 
the shot is given, and that administration of the vaccine should be 
delayed for premature babies or babies with neurological problems. 
Following the shot, parents should watch their children carefully for 
three days.171 Their advice is not very different from that of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics. 172 What the DPT organization 
stresses, which the American Academy of Pediatrics does not, is 
that the parents have a right to refuse the vaccination. The DPT 
organization has been active in encouraging parents to understand 
their rights before submitting their children to DPT vaccination. 173 
169 1 DISSATISFIED PARENTS TOGETHER NEWS 17 (Fall, 1983). 
170 See 1984 Hearings supra note 148, at 46. 
171 Silberner, DPT Vaccine: Weighing the Risk, Washington Post, March 27, 1985. 
172 See Sun, supra note 147. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
173 The questions posed in Pertussis Vaccine: Information for Parents, DISSATISFIED PAR-
ENTS TOGETHER, (1983) included: A. Is vaccine for pertussis legally required before my child 
may enter school? If so, how many shots are required? What flexibility does the law provide 
if a parent wants to defer the pertussis shots until the child is two years or older? What is 
the legal consequence if my child does not get the required number of shots before he or she 
enters school?; B. Does the law say that a child does not have to be vaccinated if his parents 
have a "personal conviction" or "philosophic objection", i.e., if parents believe vaccination is 
not in the child's best interest? Does the law provide an exemption on the grounds of religious 
conviction?; C. What is the legal definition in your state or county of a "medical exemption" 
to the pertussis vaccine? What latitude is given to the physician's judgment as to whether or 
not the pertussis vaccine is medically contraindicated for a particular child? 
The DPT organization stresses that, using government data, as of December, 1983, nine states 
did not have laws requiring DPT vaccination as a precondition for school entry: Arizona, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wash-
ington. Twenty-two states permit parents to object to a mandated DPT vaccine on the grounds 
of "personal conviction" or "philosophical objection:" Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wis-
consin. In addition, in these states a child may be exempted from the vaccine requirement if 
the parent can obtain a written statement from a physician stating that the vaccine would be 
detrimental to the child's health. Most states will exempt a child from the vaccine requirement 
if the parent objects on the grounds of religious conviction. Vaccine laws vary from state to 
state, and even from county to county. A few states do not require DPT vaccine at all, and 
some areas require only three or four shots. Different school districts have different rules 
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Dissatisfied Parents Together thus encourages parents who object 
to vaccination to use legally available means to avoid it. They have 
had one legislative success at the state level. On May 29, 1984, 
Maryland became the first state to adopt the vaccine reform legis-
lation supported by the DPT organization. 174 The law requires health 
care providers to give the parents written information regarding the 
risks and benefits of all required vaccines. Health care providers 
must record the name of the manufacturer and the lot number of all 
DPT vaccinations administered. 175 The law requires health care pro-
viders to record any severe DPT vaccine reactions and to report 
them to the state health authorities. 176 The State Health Department 
is required to identify contraindications to the vaccine and categories 
of high risk children. 177 Individual doctors are authorized to exempt 
any child from mandatory DPT vaccination if the doctor finds that 
the risks of the vaccine outweigh the benefits to both the potential 
recipient and the public. 
The new statute may limit the effect of Syska v. Montgomery 
County Board of Education. 178 In Syska, decided in 1980, the court 
held that the exclusion of pupils who had not been immunized against 
rubella did not violate the constitutional rights of mothers who had 
personal, philosophical objections to the immunization program, even 
though the statute provided an exemption for people who have re-
ligious objections to immunizations. The new statutory exemption 
for individual children, if limited to contraindications along the lines 
of those listed in the "Red Book," does little more than demand that 
physicians not engage in malpractice. If, on the other hand, the 
statute enables parents to opt out of the state's vaccination program 
and the parents use it to do so, then the public health value of 
vaccination programs could suffer. Despite this worrisome issue, the 
information and record keeping requirements imposed by the statute 
will be useful. 
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts 179 in 1905, it has been clear that a state's police power 
regarding pre-entry vaccination requirements. See Pertussis Vaccine: Information for Par-
ents, DISSATISFIED PARENTS TOGETHER (1983). See also U.S. DEPT. OF HHS, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL, DIVISION OF IMMUNIZATION, STATE IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS Ap-
PLICABLE TO ANY OR ALL GRADES K-12 (December, 1983) . 
174 MD. [HEALTH) CODE ANN. §§ 18-328 (Supp. 1985). 
175Id. at § 18-330(a). 
176Id. 
177Id. 
178 45 Md. App. 626 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
179 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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permitted the enactment of compulsory vaccination legislation. In 
that case, the statute provided an exception for "children who pres-
ent a certificate, signed by a registered physician that they are unfit 
subjects for vaccination. "180 The plaintiff, however, was an adult who 
sought to avoid small pox vaccination based on the fear of an adverse 
reaction which he experienced as a child. The Court, after reviewing 
the development of the English and American laws of compulsory 
vaccination, upheld the statute but left open the possibility that the 
plaintiff Jacobson had a right to avoid vaccination if it could be shown 
with reasonable certainty that he was not a fit subject for vaccina-
tion, or that vaccination would seriously impair his health or prob-
ably cause his death. 181 Thus, the current DPT controversy echoes 
the history of small pox vaccination. Regulations requiring all school 
children to be vaccinated or to face exclusion from public schools 
have been upheld. 182 However, exceptions when the health of the 
child makes the vaccination unsafe have also been upheld. 183 
Most states have exceptions for those with religious objections to 
vaccinations. Unfortunately, those children whose parents' religion 
forbids immunizations may still develop communicable diseases, and 
those children can infect others in the population whose immunity is 
not complete. A recent example of this danger occurred at Principia 
College in Illinois where 100 students developed measles, and three 
students died. 184 The college is a Christian Scientist institution; since 
Christian Scientists do not believe in medical intervention the stu-
dent body lacked the usual immunizations. The college did, however, 
permit 415 of the approximately 750 students and staff to be im-
munized after the measles outbreak. 185 
Concern over religious freedom must be balanced against society's 
need to be protected from disease. This was the position taken by 
the Mississippi Supreme Court when, in 1979, the statutory religious 
exemption from immunization was held to be a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 186 The court concluded it would be unfair to 
ISO [d. at 12. 
181 [d. at 39. 
182 Seubold v. Fort Smith Special School Dist., 218 Ark. 560, 237 S.W.2d 884 (1951); City 
of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918); Zucht v. King, 225 S.W. 
267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 650 (1921). 
183 Zucht v. San Antonio School Bd., 170 S.W. 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914), reh'g denied, Nov. 
18, 1914. 
184 Baker, Measles Outbreak Fatal To 3 Christian Scientists, Washington Post, March 6, 
1985, at 1, col. 4. 
185 [d. 
186 Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979). 
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require the bulk of the school children to be vaccinated, and at the 
same time expose them to the hazard of associating with children 
who were exempted from compulsory vaccination. In a similar case, 
the State Supreme Court of Arkansas held that parents have no 
legal right to prevent vaccination of their children, even based on 
their good faith religious beliefs. 187 The court quoted the Supreme 
Court of the United States: "the right to practice religion freely does 
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to commun-
icable disease or the latter to ill health or death .... "188 This court 
ruled that the Arkansas probate court should appoint a guardian to 
take custody of the children with directions to have them vaccinated 
despite the father's testimony that if the children were taken from 
him and vaccinated he would not accept them back. 
It may be understandable that parents who have seen their chil-
dren suffer and even die from DPT vaccination complications should 
lobby for laws that limit required vaccinations, even though the 
potential effect might be to end effective immunization programs. 
Nevertheless, the effect of such legislation is adverse to public health 
interests. Unfortunately, the DPT immunization issue is complicated 
by its history of an insensitive health bureaucracy, and a manufac-
turing system that only provides the public with vaccine when it is 
profitable to the industry. Consequently, if safer vaccines are to be 
developed, federal subsidies must be provided whenever develop-
ment costs are substantial and benefits are modest. This puts citizens 
seeking an improved DPT vaccine into a large group of disease 
lobbyists, each of whom seeks a larger slice of the federal public 
health budget. Since a new DPT vaccine is unlikely to be produced 
in the near future, citizen efforts today seem to be directed at 
allowing citizens the right to opt out of the system. 
The host of exceptions to the need for obtaining vaccinations found 
in state law is unwise. The exceptions so far have existed without 
much ill result because few people have utilized them. If we are to 
have organized resistance to health programs, the societal tolerance 
of individual idiosyncrasies must end if public health is to be pro-
tected. The only exception from required vaccination should be in 
situations where the shot is contraindicated for medical reasons 
specific to the individual, keeping in mind that for DPT the list of 
contraindication may need to be expanded. 
187 Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964). 
188 Id. at 819 (quoting Prince v. Comm. of Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1943». 
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More governmental attention must be paid to the supervision of 
public health programs. Vaccines are not as safe as they could be, 
and the surveillance system is not designed to collect valid data upon 
which rational public policy can be made. Adverse DPT reactions 
could be reduced, however, by more careful decisions concerning 
when and who to vaccinate. Perhaps one way to encourage such 
improvements would be to force the public to absorb the costs of 
compensating vaccine-induced injuries. This is the focus of DPT bills 
that recently have been introduced in Congress. 
V. PROPOSED NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
On September 23, 1982, Senator Hawkins introduced a bill189 that 
called for a study of the DPT vaccine. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Schweiker agreed to carry out the study under 
existing administrative authority, making the proposed legislation 
unnecessary. During 1983, Congressional hearings were held on the 
DPT issue, and on November 17,1983, Senators Hawkins and Hatch 
introduced the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Act. 190 More hearings were held in the spring of 1984, and on June 
7, 1984, Representative Waxman introduced a similar bill in the 
House of Representatives. 191 Although the House held hearings in 
the fall, the year ended without action on either of the bills. Senator 
Hawkins introduced a revised bill,192 on April 2, 1985, cosponsored 
by Senators Hatch, Bumpers, and Matsunaga. This bill is supported 
by the Academy of Pediatrics, Dissatisfied Parents Together, the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, the American 
Nurses Association, and numerous other health-oriented organiza-
tions. 
Another bill193 was introduced by Congressmen Madigan and Broy-
hill on March 27, 1985. Their bill is far less comprehensive than the 
Hawkins bill. It would give the drug companies, not the plaintiffs, 
the right to choose a compensation system. Compensation for vac-
cine-induced injuries would be discretionary, with a cap of $1 million 
on all compensation or tort recovery. 194 There would be no com pen-




192 S. 827, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
193 H.R. 1780, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
194Id. at § 2107(b). 
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sation for death caused by vaccine. 195 The Department of Health and 
Human Services would have control over the compensation and the 
program could apply to any vaccine listed by HHS.196 
On the other hand,197 the Hawkins bill is a far more comprehensive 
bill because it provides for compensation as well as vaccine reinsur-
ance. In addition, it has a number of provisions designed to assure 
a safer childhood vaccination program in the future. It creates an 
affirmative and enforceable duty for HHS to promote the develop-
ment of safer vaccines. 198 Citizen suits are provided to force HHS to 
carry out the bill's requirements. 199 Recording and reporting of major 
reaction to vaccine is mandatory and other requirements are imposed 
that are aimed at improving surveillance and recall. 200 Record keep-
ing and reporting requirements for manufacturers are also made 
more stringent. 201 The Secretary of HHS would have discretionary 
authority to provide for pooling arrangements, reinsurance or direct 
insurance to assure the availability of mandated vaccines at reason-
able prices. 202 
The bill's most important, and most controversial, aspect involves 
its compensation provisions. Plaintiffs could elect to sue a manufac-
turer in tort, or could utilize the administrative and judicial system 
provided in the bill. 203 Plaintiffs would bring an ex parte civil action 
in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia and that court 
would designate special masters or magistrates to take evidence and 
develop a record. 204 The magistrates would develop proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law subject to de novo determination 
by the court.205 Appeals would be to the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit and would be heard on an expedited 
schedule. 206 If a plaintiff selects the tort approach, state law would 
be applied except that liability cannot be based solely on the manu-
195 Death resulting from vaccination is not listed as a compensable injury. [d. at § 2107(b). 
196 The Act would add a new title XI to the Public Health Service Act. The Act's proposed 
coverage is set forth in § 2114(3) of the Act. 
197 S. 827, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
198 [d. at § 2144. 
199 [d. at § 216l. 
200 [d. at § 2141-43. 
201 [d. at § 2145. 
202 [d. at § 2121-2126. 
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facturer's failure to directly warn the parent or the person vacci-
nated.207 
If a claimant is found to be eligible for compensation, then payment 
of damages is mandatory.208 Pain and suffering damages are limited 
to a maximum of $100,000, plus the amounts necessary for medical 
care, education, rehabilitation, and custodial care necessary for the 
child to achieve maximum feasible potential and enjoyment of life. 209 
Since a severely injured child may consume care and education that 
exceeds $10,000 a month, the amount recoverable can thus be very 
large. Damages can also include the anticipated loss of earnings when 
the child becomes an adult.210 If death occurs, recovery will not be 
less than $300,000 or more than $700,000 plus expenses incurred.2l1 
Attorneys' fees are added to the award so as not to diminish the 
amount given to claimants.212 After the federal government pays the 
award, it can then sue the physician, or other health care providers, 
based on negligence or the manufacturer for providing a defective 
or unreasonably dangerous vaccine. 213 
The most unusual feature of this bill is that injuries that occur 
within the time period set forth in a vaccine injury table are deemed 
to be vaccine-related, and compensation is made mandatory.214 It 
includes as compensable events those occurrences in which there is 
no scientific consensus as to whether or not the occurrences were 
caused by, or related to, the vaccine.215 To avoid paying, the gov-
ernment would have to prove through incontrovertible evidence that 
other causation was responsible. Measles, rubella, polio, and related 
vaccines are also covered. The bill sets forth the evidence require-
ments to ensure that claimants have every possible opportunity to 
collect. If all the evidentiary aids still do not provide a basis for 
recovery, the petitioner can use any credible evidence that the injury 
was caused by a vaccine listed on the vaccine table. 216 
For DPT vaccine, in addition to the diseases recognized as being 
related to these shots, the Secretary is required to review all rele-
vant medical and scientific information and to determine the rela-
207 Id. at § 2102 (c) (2) (A). 
208 Id. at § 2107. 
209 Id. at § 2107(a)(1)(3), (b)(I), and (b)(2). 
210 Id. at § 2107(a)(4). 
211 Id. at § 2107(a)(2). 
212 I d. at § 2107(0. 
213 I d. at § 2108. 
214 I d. at § 2105. 
2151d. 
2161d. at § 2105(a)(2). 
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tionship of the vaccine to a host of maladies including autism, learn-
ing disabilities, and hyperactivity. If such a relationship is found, 
the DPT vaccine table will be modified appropriately.217 
This bill does not solve the liability problems of manufacturers or 
health care providers who face law suits based on strict product 
liability. The bill does, however, abolish liability based solely on the 
failure to provide a direct warning to the injured parties or the 
parties' parents. 218 The manufacturers and health care providers can 
still be sued at the claimants' option, or by the government in a 
subrogation action. In the bill, the government is encouraged to 
provide subsidized insurance to manufacturers. 219 The government 
may find itself paying for both the compensation system and the 
insurance so that it can sue in a subrogation action. The bill provides 
that compensation would be paid from a National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Trust Fund,220 which may in turn be derived from 
charges on vaccines. Such a fund is designed to encourage the pro-
duction of safer vaccines. However, sufficient discretion is given to 
HHS so that the Secretary has the latitude to attempt other methods 
of shifting costs to manufacturers. 221 
The large number of children vaccinated each year in the United 
States, the bill's liberalized evidence rules, and the broad scope of 
compensable injuries, make the potential cost of this bill enormous. 
The largest cost component of the Hawkins bill will be compensation 
for lost earnings. This is expected to compromise 63 percent of the 
average cost per case. Attorneys' fees, at 17 percent of the average 
cost per case, are the second largest component. Medical costs and 
rehabilitation costs combined are expected to amount to about 10 
percent of the cost per case. 222 Since most victims are children, the 
major cost will be to cover wages children might eventually have 
earned. 
The potential expense was one reason the Reagan Administration 
opposed the bill as originally drafted. The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the program could cost $4.9 billion for the first 
three years. 223 If the number of diseases covered by the bill expands, 
the costs of compensation could become astronomical. With an open-
217Id. at § 2105(c). 
218Id. at § 2102(c)(2)(A). 
219 I d. at § 2126. 
220 I d. at § 2110. 
221Id. 
222 See 1984 Hearings, supra note 148, at 75. 
223 See Sun, supra note 147. 
206 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:169 
ended right to any and all medical services necessary to achieve 
"maximum feasible potential", 224 the injured person or his parents 
have a federal, medical blank check. In an era of great concern for 
soaring medical costs, another law with major inflationary potential 
may be unwise. 
This bill provides a useful subject for debate and its provisions for 
improvement of the vaccine programs deserve serious consideration. 
The concept of a compensation trust fund, through which the cost of 
vaccine can reflect at least some of the social costs, is a commendable 
one. However, the bill seems to be drafted with the assumption that 
public funds are infinite and that sick people have a right to unlimited 
federal resources. Unfortunately, both concepts are at variance with 
current economic and political reality. 
What is needed is a compensation system modeled along the lines 
of workers' compensation. 225 Basic costs of medical care and reha-
bilitation costs would be covered, as well as actual lost wages. Per-
haps a stipend could be paid to those who could not work because of 
vaccine-caused injuries. There would be no payment for pain and 
suffering. 
A person developing a disease who did not receive a vaccination 
should not be eligible for compensation because immunizations are 
required for public benefit, so it is important that those injured by 
vaccination are better treated than those not vaccinated even if a 
vaccination was not given because of contraindication. Such individ-
uals would be in no worse a position than they would be without the 
vaccination compensation program, in which case they would have 
to rely on traditional methods of financing for their health care. 
The standards for recovery should be relatively generous in order 
to assure coverage for all actual victims, even if some injuries of 
questionable medical causation are covered. Compensation would be 
modest. The federal compensation payments would exist as a lien 
against any tort settlement or tort judgment. This would tend to 
reduce tort claims of questionable legal validity as well as those 
involving minor injuries. Litigation could be further controlled by 
allowing only recoveries in excess of the lien to be the basis for 
attorney fees. Tort actions against health delivery personnel would 
be unchanged, though it might be useful to define informed consent 
in the statute. 226 
224 Id. 
225 See generally, LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW (1984). 
226 There seems to be no reason to shelter health care providers from malpractice claims in 
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Manufacturers would be liable in tort if they provided defective 
vaccine. Vaccine that was produced to federal standards should ben-
efit from at least a rebuttable presumption of soundness. In addition, 
manufacturers should not be liable for failure to warn the ultimate 
consumer when adequate warnings were given to health care profes-
sionals administering the vaccine program. Traditional tort liability 
would, however, still subject manufacturers to the cost of adminis-
tering claims and litigation, which was a major concern in their 
demand for the protection provided in the Swine Flu Act. However, 
such claims would be reduced by requiring fault as a condition of 
liability and limiting the basis for attorneys' fees. 
The Hawkins bill227 provides that plaintiffs may elect to sue in 
tort, or to apply for federal compensation. This approach maximizes 
the cost, while failing to address the needs of manufacturers who 
are exposed to major liability. The costs are maximized because of 
legal theories that make fault irrelevant, and that require manufac-
turers to be insurers, even though their business may be uninsura-
ble. 
The cost of a compensation approach is difficult to compare to a 
tort system approach. A compensation system could benefit a group 
that, depending on the statute's language, covered some, all, or a 
group larger than those injured from vaccines. The tort system 
usually provides a much larger recovery to a smaller portion of those 
injured. When a bill such as the Hawkins bill allows plaintiffs to 
choose, costs are maximized because those with strong tort cases 
will pursue that remedy and those with weaker claims will seek 
federal compensation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The pressure is on the public health profession to improve the 
public's perception of their performance. The swine flu program is 
perceived by the public as a governmental failure, even though the 
major problem was that the disease did not appear. DPT is still an 
issue that, at this writing, is surrounded by controversy. A reservoir 
of public frustration exists, and its depth is dependent upon the 
the vaccine area. One cannot read the case law concerning vaccination injuries without being 
aware of the number of cases of obvious failure to provide acceptable medical care. There may 
be reasons to reexamine the entire medical malpractice field in light of soaring costs, but 
vaccine-related injuries are an insignificant part of the problem. 8ee Dentzer & Tsuruoka, 
Malpractice Insurers Are Ill, NEWSWEEK (April 29, 1985) at 58. 
227 8.827, 99th Cong., 1st 8ess. (1985). 
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number of Americans who perceive their children's health problems 
to be vaccine-related. 
Since the French chemist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) developed 
the technique of immunization and produced vaccines, the world has 
depended on them to control disease. 228 His vaccine replaced such 
rabies treatments as filling the wound with gunpowder and then 
setting it afire or suffocating the victim between two mattresses. 
With a disease as deadly as rabies, the side effects of the vaccine 
are accepted, and today, with a much safer vaccine, 15 to 30 thousand 
Americans are treated for possible exposure to rabies. 229 Unlike the 
rabies vaccine, most vaccinations are given before a person is ex-
posed to the disease and thus few recipients of vaccines are choosing 
as clearly between probable death from the disease and the consid-
erably smaller risk of dying from the preventive treatment. . 
Vaccination programs aimed at providing protection before expo-
sure to the disease depend upon the population developing a high 
percentage of immune individuals to limit or prevent transmission 
of the disease. This is called "herd" immunity. For example, when 
the level of measle immunity in the population exceeds 53 percent, 
one study found epidemics were unlikely to develop.230 This concept 
of trying to use vaccination as a control measure applies primarily 
to disease where human-to-human transmission occurs. Since receiv-
ing a vaccination always carries some risk, the truly rational person 
would seek to avoid vaccination but would require everyone else to 
get one. This type of thinking could cause vaccination programs to 
become ineffective. If everyone could choose whether or not to be 
immunized, the necessary level of immunity in the population might 
not be maintained. This is an example of classical Hobbesian theory; 
there must be submission to the sovereign to maintain public order 
- the society must require immunization. The public health require-
ment of population-wide vaccination is accompanied by a compelling 
moral responsibility to compensate those who are injured by coop-
erating for the benefit of the "herd". Moreover, today those who are 
inoculated may receive little personal benefit if the disease is largely 
absent. For example, in 1984 only 7 polio cases were reported in the 
United States. 231 Since 1969 most polio cases were caused by vac-
= See MEDICAL DICTIONARY supra note 6, at 1239. 
229 Williams, A Disease Most Awful, AUDUBON, July 1984 at 16. 
230 Hinman, Kirby, et al., Elimination of Indigenous Measles from the United States, 5 
REV. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 538 (June 1983). 
231 Hemispheric War on Polio Declared, Washington Post, May 15, 1985 at 2. 
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cine. 232 Sometimes inoculations are given to one group to protect a 
different group such as injections given to prevent rubella (German 
Measles). Children receive the shots, but the target population to 
be protected is pregnant women and their unborn children. Vaccines 
are the only consumer goods required to be consumed by law. Since 
consumption often benefits the public far more than the recipient, 
justice requires that those receiving the benefits of having their 
fellow citizens vaccinated must share in the cost of caring for those 
whom fate or malpractice has decreed will be victims. 
The obligation to pay compensation should be a federal one.233 
Now that product liability law has removed fault and, perhaps, even 
the need to know that a danger might exist, the tort system's ca-
pacity to modify conduct has all but disappeared. Moreover, the 
manufacturers' unknown and long term continuing exposure to lia-
bility denies private insurers the ability to properly evaluate risk 
and determine the premiums. Although it is in the national interest 
to have an assured supply of vaccines available for public health 
protection, few manufacturers will sell products for a price of $3 
thereby assuming a potential risk of legal damages in excess of $1 
million. The vaccine industry exists in a tenuous state in which tort 
liability could drive the few remaining manufacturers out of the 
business. If the case law continues to develop as it has, and punitive 
damages are allowed against manufacturers in inadequate warning 
cases, we may find ourselves with no vaccine. 234 While there is a 
declining number of DPT vaccine manufacturers, there is only one 
manufacturer each for polio, measles, German measles, and mumps 
vaccines. If any of these producers leave the marketplace, children 
232 National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing before the Comm. On 
Labor And Human Resources, 98th Congo 2d. Sess. (1984). 
233 As the American vaccination programs have become heavily federalized, decisions made 
by the federal government have largely come to determine what vaccines will be developed 
and when they will be licensed. The testing required by the federal government can delay or 
prevent a vaccine from being marketed. After licensing, the federal government has a major 
role in ensuring the safety of the manufacturing process. It can require testing of all lots 
produced, or statistical sampling of production, or merely rely on detailed descriptions by the 
manufacturer of its production steps (called protocols). For a discussion of the federal gov-
ernment's tort liability, see Griffin V. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); Loge V. 
United States, 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981). 
Since the Poliomyelitis Vaccination Assistance Act of 1955, the federal government has 
played a major role in the distribution of vaccine. More recently the federal government 
became involved in compensating victims as well. See Technical Information For Congress: 
Report to the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Development of the Comm. on Science 
and Astronautics, 92d. Cong., 1st. Sess. (1969), revised April 15, 1971. 
234 See e.g., Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
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could go without immunization. 235 There is a wealth of literature 
addressing the question of who should bear the risk of an activity 
causing harm.236 Under tests such as who can best avoid the harm, 
and who can best absorb the costs there is little reason to hold 
vaccine manufacturers liable in the absence of traditional fault con-
cepts. 
If Congress develops a national program to compensate vaccine-
induced injuries, they must address several issues: which types of 
vaccinations will be covered; whether such a program continues to 
force those supplying vaccine to be at least as careful as they would 
be under a tort system; and whether there are compensable diseases 
causally related to the vaccination within acceptable limits of error. 237 
A policy is needed that will encompass new advances in medicine. 
For instance, in the near future there may be a herpes vaccine 
developed. 238 The other major subject of vaccine research is Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). CDC estimates that up to 1 
million Americans have been exposed to or infected by the AIDS 
virus. The disease is spreading throughout the world, and is assum-
ing the characteristics of a pandemic. Work goes forward on a vac-
cine. However, the complications discussed earlier concerning influ-
enza could recur with AIDS because the antigen that stimulates 
production of specific antibodies varies considerably from strain to 
strain of the disease. Thus a single vaccine, even if it works, will 
235 1984 Hearings, supra note 148, at 128 (testimony of Am. Academy of Pediatrics). 
236 Judge Learned Hand analyzed these problems in the context of duty in United States v. 
Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). He held that the duty of a plaintiff depended 
on the probability of injury, the gravity of the injury, and the burden of taking adequate 
precautions. This kind of analysis would not support the present trend toward strict liability 
for vaccine producers. More modern writers have produced much material on economic ap-
proaches to tort liability, but this literature does not supply much justification for holding 
manufacturers liable either. See generally RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (2d ed. 1983); 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983). 
237 Tetanus toxoid vaccine, for example, has few neurological complications. Tetanus toxoid 
vaccine may not be necessary to include in a compensation program. But pertussis and 
diptheria vaccinations are usually given as a series of inoculations that include tetanus toxoid 
protection (DPT). Diptheria shots do have complications and pertussis has become very 
controversial. From a policy point of view, it would make sense to include all the vaccines 
that are widely required for children by state law. This would include vaccination for tetanus, 
pertussis, mumps, diptheria, measles, rubella, and polio (though, only the last four are 
required by all states). 
Other diseases that are the subject of vaccination include typhoid, rabies, pneumonia, 
dysentery, and cholera. In the United States, however, these diseases are not the subject of 
widespread immunization programs, and therefore do not seem to require political or legal 
attention. 
238 Russell, NIH Reports Progress on Vaccine Against Herpes, Washington Post, May 3, 
1985, at 1, col. 1. 
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not wipe out the disease. The head of CDC's task force on AIDS 
warns that if a practical vaccine is developed it will probably have 
to be administered to every citizen in the country. 239 
Other diseases for which vaccine research is ongoing include can-
cer, toxic shock syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, diarrhea, malaria, 
infant meningitis, croup, pneumonia, and strep throat. Furthermore, 
the advances in recombinant DNA methods promise to produce new 
vaccines that may protect against more than one disease. 24o It seems 
clear that there must be some reform of the legal system to address 
the issues involved in vaccination programs. The legal problems will 
only intensify as we move towards implementing programs which 
entail far more uncertainty than was the situation in the swine flu 
program. 
In the swine flu program, the legal system worked reasonably well 
to compensate those injured. The legal system also has had an un-
quantifiable beneficial restraining effect on the federal health bu-
reaucracy. However, on balance, the tort system of compensation 
without fault is inadequate because in order to function properly, it 
requires scientific judgment beyond the ability of most judges and 
juries. The inefficiencies of the tort system result in an expensive 
system which compensates a far larger group than the group that is 
actually injured by vaccine. 241 
If the incidence of medical side effects to the vaccine had been 
high, the costs of running the swine flu compensation program could 
have been extraordinary. In passing the swine flu legislation, Con-
gress was lucky. Congress did not have such good luck with the 
black lung program242 which has turned into a foray on the national 
treasury.243 The black lung program began in 1969 and was intended 
to give temporary compensation to an estimated 100,000 retired 
miners.244 Two days before the passage of the 1969 legislation, a 
239 Clark & Coppols, AIDS: A Growing "Pandemic"? NEWSWEEK, April 29, 1985, at 7l. 
240 Id. 
241 Raeburn, Multipurpose Vaccines, HIGH TECH., April 1985, at 70. 
242 For example, in the swine flu program, the best scientific evidence indicates that less 
than 300 people were injured. If we compensate those who had a greater than 50 percent 
probability of injury from swine flu vaccine, the compensated group should have numbered 
approximately 600. To date there has been almost double that number of people compensated 
and 167 cases were pending as of April 1985. It can be expected that a compensation system 
will lead to recovery for those who can present a credible potential claim (a group much larger 
than the group actually injured). 
243 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982). 
244 See Strader & Sheehe, Federal Black Lung: Ten Years of Legislation and Litigation, 16 
FORUM 525 (1981). 
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Congressional committee expanded the proposed legislation to pro-
vide compensation for simple pneumoconiosis, as well as for compli-
cated pneumoconiosis.245 In 1972, the Act was amended to make it 
easier for claimants to collect. 246 The U. S. Supreme Court upheld 
the statute in 1976. 247 In 1978, the program was amended again248 to 
make it still easier for miners to collect,249 and a Black Lung Dis-
ability Trust Fund was created to finance some of the liability 
through an excise tax on underground and surface-mined coal. 250 By 
245 Federal Coal Mine Health and Saftey Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 
(1969). See also H.R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2503, 2520. 
246 Conf. Rep. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
2578, 2603-06. Pneumoconiosis can be complicated or simple, neither of which is defined in 
the statute. Simple pneumoconiosis is diagnosed when fibrotic clusters in the lung produce x-
ray opacities of 1 cm. or less or fibrotic masses on autopsy smaller than "massive lesions". 
Simple pneumoconiosis may have some effect on the blood/gas exchange capacity of the lungs; 
it is not considered disabling and is seldom productive of significant respiratory impairment. 
Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 679 
(1983). 
247 Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972). 
248 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
249 Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978). 
250 The 1969 Act contained three presumptions: (1) a coal miner with 10 or more years of 
underground coal mine employment who had coal worker's pneumoconiosis was rebuttably 
presumed to have contracted pneumoniocosis as a result of his coal mine employment; (2) a 
coal miner with 10 or more years of underground mine employment who died of any respirable 
disease was rebuttably presumed to have died due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis (this 
presumption was eliminated by the 1981 amendments); and (3) a coal miner with a chronic 
dust disease of the lung which was diagnosed by chest x-ray to meet certain criteria or was 
diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy to yield massive lesions created an irrebuttable presumption 
that the miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to 
pneumoconiosis. Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 411(c), 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1969). 
The first presumption allows the claimaint to establish that his disease arose out of his 
employment. The last two presumptions equate different lung diseases with coal worker's 
pneumoconiosis and thereby extend benefits to a much larger class of persons than those who 
are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 
The 1972 amendments added a fourth presumption. This presumption provided that: (1) if 
a miner was employed for 15 or more years in an underground coal mine; (2) his chest x-ray 
was negative for complicated pneumoconiosis (the third and most serious stage of the disease); 
and (3) other evidence established the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pUlmonary 
impairment, then the miner was presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis or his 
death was presumed to have been caused by it. Pub. L. No. 92-303, § 4(c), 86 Stat. 150, 154 
(1972). This presumption ignored the cause of the respiratory or pulmonary impairment; it 
could be due to many factors not related to exposure to coal dust. The 1981 amendments 
repealed this presumption in regard to all claims filed after the effective date of the 1981 
amendments. 
With the 1978 amendments, Congress added another presumption: the "widows' presump-
tion." If a miner who .died before M.arch 1, 1978 and had been employed for 25 or more years 
in a coal mine before June 30, 1971, the eligible survivors shall be entitled to benefits unless 
it can be established that the miner was not totally or partially disabled from pneumoconiosis 
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the end of 1981, 542,000 miners, dependents, and survivors of de-
ceased miners had collected over $10 billion in benefits paid from 
general appropriations. 251 In addition, by 1981, the Trust Fund had 
a deficit of 1.4 billion dollars and a projected deficit of 19.2 billion 
dollars by 1995.252 
The black lung program is the one federal program aimed at 
compensating members of the public who have a specific disease. 
Compared to the problems involved in determining causation for 
vaccination-related injuries, the black lung diagnosis is simple. Yet 
the black lung program has demonstrated the tenacity with which 
potential claimants, their lawyers, and their elected representatives 
attempt to change statutes and regulations to allow recovery from 
the federal treasury. Proposed programs to compensate those ex-
posed to agent orange, ionizing radiation, or toxic dumps all suffer 
from the problem that accurate identification of the persons and 
injuries caused by the offensive substances is impossible with our 
current level of scientific and medical knowledge. The government's 
experience with the black lung program should emphasize to the 
drafters of any new compensation program the importance of dealing 
meaningfully and convincingly with the need for accurate cost pro-
jections and cost containment. 
The Hawkins bill is a thoughtful legislative proposal. Its chance 
for eventual passage would be enhanced if the overall costs were 
lowered through less generous payments and tighter causation re-
quirements. 253 When, and if, a federal compensation program is en-
at the time of his death. Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 95, 96 (1978). If the miner met 
the requirements under this provision regarding length of employment and date of death, his 
beneficiaries were entitled to benefits even if the miner's death was totally unrelated to his 
coal mine employment. This presumption was repealed by the 1981 amendments as of their 
effective date. 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1982). 
251 Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978). In 
1981, legislation significantly tightened the requirements for black lung eligibility, but only 
for claims filed on or after January 1, 1982. The new legislation also increased the tax on 
mined coal to try to return the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to solvency. Pub. L. No. 
97-119,95 Stat. 1635 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4121, 30 U.S.C. §§ 922-23). 
252 Lopatto, supra note 246, at 678. 
253 A Government Accounting Office (GAO) random study of Social Security Approvals 
indicated that 88.5 percent were not based on adequate medical evidence establishing total 
disability or death from black lung disease. LEGISLATION ALLOWS BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
TO BE AWARDED WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY, H.R. Doc. No. 80-81, 96th 
Cong., 2d. Sess. (1980). After the 1981 legislation a similar conclusion was made by GAO 
concerning the Department of Labor's implementation of the 1978 amendments. LEGISLATION 
AUTHORIZED BENEFITS WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF BLACK LUNG OR DISABILITY, 
H.R. Doc. No. 82-26, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982). 
Even without a compensation program, the federal government still pays, because it sup-
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acted, its scope of coverage and generosity of payments will un-
doubtedly be a function of what the projected costs will be. After 
the legal surprise generated by the swine flu program and the black 
lung program, legislators will be wary of amorphous and ambiguous 
federal compensation programs. The tort system, particularly when 
it was based on fault concepts, served society by making a person 
or corporation responsible for the effects of their wrongdoing. This 
system is threatened as concepts for redistribution of wealth have 
come to dominate the tort field. Perhaps in an era prior to the 
industrial revolution, the tort system could be a social insurance 
system. Today it is not working well. The legislative proposal made 
here is a conservative one. It is designed to preserve the virtue of 
a tort system designed to redress wrongs. At the same time society, 
as the beneficiary of vaccination programs, should pay the costs of 
a social insurance program to assure at least basic financial support 
for those who become casualties in the war on disease. The type of 
legislation recently passed in Maryland, discussed above, and the 
pending federal legislation are the result of the public's diminishing 
faith in vaccination programs. The ultimate results of both federal 
and state legislative efforts could reduce the efficacy of vaccination 
programs. The exemptions provided in state laws may make it easier 
for people to avoid vaccination; the federal legislation could make 
the compensation costs so high that the government would avoid 
immunization programs. Vaccination programs require concen-
trated, constructive improvement. There is every reason to believe 
that our society will have an increased need for such programs. We 
no longer live in a frontier society where each family can decide 
whether it wishes to participate in public health programs. What is 
needed is an affordable and administratively manageable federal 
compensation program combined with a substantial effort to reduce 
the medical risks associated with current vaccines. 
ports health care programs such as Medicaid, Social Security Insurance, maternal and child 
health block grants, and the Education For All Handicapped Children Act. No figures exist, 
however, as to how much these programs pay to victims of immunization injuries. The 
government also buys about 30 per cent of the most commonly used immunization vaccines. 
These vaccines have increased in price over the past ten years by an average of 6.9 to 25 
percent a year. What portion of the price increases represent increases due to tort law and 
whether prices would decline with a federal compensation program is unknown. See 1984 
Hearings, supra note 148, at 189-90. 
